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Greater abundance of statistical data in many countries has made 
it possible to compute national income at shorter intervals and 
with greater accuracy than before. Not 'Only  have the data be-
come more plentiful, but also the methods have been improved 
and  the concepts defined more precisely so  that a  number of 
mistakes frequently made in earlier computations are now being 
avoided. 
In addition. a distinctive and significant change in the tenor 
and purpose of nationaJ  income calculations  has  occurred  in 
recent  years.  National  income  has  always  been  regarded  by 
economists as a comprehensive measure of economic progress, of 
economic welfare. The interest attached to national income from 
the welfare  point of view has recently spread from  the profes-
sional economist to the general public.  Governments and poli-
ticians have acquired the habit of formulating the aim, and of 
measuring the success,  of thdr economic  policies  in tenus of 
national income. 
Meanwhile,  economists  have gradually become  more inter-
ested in national income also for another reason: they use it in-
creasingly  as  a  tool  of economic  analysis.  From  that point of 
view,  however,  interest attaches not so  much to  aggregate na-
tional income itself as to its component parts. But since some of 
these  are defined  or calculated as  residuals,  a  measure of the 
total' becomes indispensable for measuring the parts. 
I  National  Income  as a Welfare  Concept 
I  VALUE JUDGMENTS IN WELFARE PROBLEMS 
Let us first discuss national income as a welfare concept. I  shall 
not go at great length into what I  should call the philosophical 
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p~oblems of welfare economics as  they  are discussed,  say,  by 
Professor Pigou in the first part of his Economics oj Welfar8 or even 
more penetratingly by Professor Gunnar Myrdal in his  book, 
The Political Element in  the Development if  Economic Doctrinesl  (Pro-
fessor  Myrd~l, by the way, seems to me to adopt a  somewh~t too 
skeptical or too austere attitude and throws out the child with 
the bath water.) These more philosophical discussions demon-
strate that all welfare probelms involve value judgments which 
are not capable of a purely scientific solution. The scientific task 
consists in making these value  judgmen~s  explicit and in showing 
which value judgments underlie the ordinary methods of com-
puting national income. The problem is somewhat more difficult 
than it would perhaps seem at first blush, because it is not simply 
a 'question of attaching a value index to a final result that could 
be reached quite independently of whether a  value is  attached 
to it. Unfortunately, the method of arriving at a final measure of 
national income itself does depend on, and vary with, the under-
lying value judgments. But as I said, I do not propose to go into 
these problems. I  prefer to leave them unsolved.2 
2  NATIONAL INCOME AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 
National income is  considered a  measure of economic welfare. 
But economic welfare is usually defined in a broader sense. It is 
therefore  better to say  that national income affects  economic 
welfare. Other things being equal, economic welfare is greater, if 
national income  is  greater.  Such other things  that also  affect 
economic welfare but are usually not considered a  part of na-
tional income are, for example, the presence or absence of cer-
I  Available in Swedish and German. 
2 In my book:  Der Sinn  tier  Intk)t~hJen  (Tubingen,  1927)  and  in the article, Der 
volkswirtschaftliche  GeIdwert  und  die  Prisindexziff'er  (WeltwirtSl&haftliches  Archiv, 
Vol. 30, July 1929, p. 6"  et seq)  I have shown that (a) for one individual, making 
several simplifying asswnptions, a  rational method of calculating changes in 'real 
income' can  be evolved;  that (b) the extension of the concept of price level and 
real income to a number of individuals (or society as  a  whole) involves  arbitrary 
decisions that can be justified only on the basis of  some value judgments. The prob-
lem mentioned under (a) has since then attracted much attention and the analysis 
has been pushed forward. (Cf. especially various articles by Hans Staehle which are 
quoted. together with other references. by Ragnar Frisch in & onometrica.  Vol. IV, 
1936, p. 2, and A. Wald, Zur Theorie der Preisindexziffern, <:,eitschrifljur National-
okonomie, Vol. VIII, 1937, pp. 179-219.) As far as I am aware the problem mentioned 
under (b) has not been constructively dealt with. See also M. A. Copeland and E. 
M. Martin, Part Two, and discussion by R. T. Bye and Milton Friedman. SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT  '4' 
tain wants. If, say, the state of health is poor and requires some 
expenditure for the service of a  physician or for  medicine, but 
does not impair the earning or producing power,3 welfare is less 
than it otherwise would be;' but we should probably not say that 
the real income is  smaller. We should rather say that a  larger 
part of the income must be spent on,  or consists  of,  medical 
services. 
Similarly, if  the economic system does not run smoothly, or is 
not believed capable of  running smoothly if  left alone and if, con-
sequently, much money and effort must be spent on 'policing' 
the system more or less extensively- from the nineteenth century 
night watchman to the Administrator of the AAA or NRA or 
any of the other alphabetical agencies--economic welfare is cer-
tainly affected.  It would be greater, if all that effort could  be 
devoted to the production of,  say, food or clothing and shelter 
for the poor. But whether national income is  ~mpaired is another 
question. If we include the services of the 'police'  (in the wide 
sense  indicated above) in national income,  it is  not. Thus in-
numerable facts affect economic welfare, that is to say, make the 
situation more or less desirable than it would be in their absence, 
but do not---or need not-in gener~  affect real income. 
3  SOME PROBLEMS OF INCOME DEFINITION 5 
a)  Value judgments in income definition 
The answers  to  the questions raised in the preceding sections 
depend, of course, on the definition of income. It can be defined 
more or less inclusively, and these questions of definition are not 
purely academic. The practical statistician is  forced  to give defi~ 
3 If  the producing power of the people is  affected, national income will be affected 
too, but to a smaller extent than economic welfare, because the medical services will 
be included in national income. 
4 As a  criterion, I  should take the preference act of the individual. The situation 
that the individual prefers we characterize as a  higher welfare position. Since we 
can rely on the preference act of the individual  (which we try to infer  from his 
behavior in the market), we  need not introduce any value judgment. If,  on the 
other hand, we deal with a multitude of individuals or with society as a whole, we 
cannot rely on individual decisions. Society as such does not act and the decisions 
and preferences of individuals will,  as a  rule, be contradictory, at least to some 
extent. Consequendy we,  that is,  the observer (scientist), will be  forced  to supply 
the unifying decision; that is  to say, we shall have"to pass a  value judgment. 
6 For other discussions of this general problem, see Studies,  Volunu  One,  (1937), M. 
A. Copeland, Part One; Clark Warburton, Part Two; and Gerhard  Colm,  Part 
Five, Sec. I. '42  PART  THREE 
nite  answers,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  whenever  he  decides 
whether he wants to include certain items in national income. 
There is  general agreement that all  goods and services that 
pass through the market are to be included, whether they are 
sold for money or exchanged one for  another" Furthermore, of 
those goods of which only a part passes through the market, that· 
part which does not change hands but is consumed by the owner 
or producer is to he included-the consumption of  farm products 
on the farm, the value of the services of a house to its owner, etc. 
The income of domestic servants--whether received in money or 
in the form of food and. lodging-is almost invariably included 
in national income.  (The question whether that is  to  be done 
may be put by asking whether the income of the employer is  to 
be defined inclusive or exclusive of the value of the wages paid 
for  domestic services  and of the food  and shelter  supplied  to 
domestic servants.) However, the line that separates a domestic 
servaJ)t from a worker may be very hazy where household and 
business are not. sharply separated as,  for example, on the farm 
or in the case of the small business of a craftsman or a shopkeeper. 
And surely the wage of a  worker has to be deducted from the 
receipts ofthe employer to arrive at the latter's net income. From 
the services of servants it is  only a  small step to the services of 
housewives and daughters which are frequently evaluated and 
included in national income. But sometimes,  especially in the 
American household, not only the female members but also the 
male  members perform many of the domestic services  that in 
other countries, where labor is  cheap, are performed by hired 
servants. It may be difficult to draw the line. 
b)  The treatment oj government  services 
There is furthermore the question of the income of the govern-
ment or rather of those who receive their income from the govern-
ment:  government  officials,  the  police  and  fighting  services, 
pensioners,  receivers of poor and unemployment relief,  and of 
subsidies,  recipients of interest on government securities,  etc.
6 
e On all this compare: Ollm, Volume One, Part Five. Dr. Colm distinguishe:s be:twe:en 
the income of the governmc:nt and the:  income:  of governmc:nt officials.  I  should 
rather pre:fe:r  to e:liminate:  the:  gove:rnmc:nt and focus attc:ntion on the:  physical in-
dividuals who rece:ive  their income:  through the gove:rnme:nt. In some cases, how-
e:ve:r,  especially in the case:  of durable: goods constructed by the government (gov-SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT  '43 
Are all these receipts to be included in national income? Or more 
precisely: if these sums are counted as income of the resp" ective 
recipients, do the  taxes and contributions from which they are 
paid have to be deducted from the income of the taxpayers? Is 
the income of the taxpayer to be defined inclusive Or exclusive of 
taxes?  An analogy will clarify this issue.  Suppose we buy food 
from a farmer or the services of a physician. What we pay to the 
farmer or to the physician comes out of our income and becomes 
income of the farmer or the  physician. We would not deduct 
these sums from Our income. If  we pay taxes, we provide income 
for a government official, a Congressman, the"  President, a WPA 
worker, a farmer who receives a subsidy, and so on. Do we have 
to deduct this from our income? Obviously it depends on whether 
we regard the various government activities as  useful. And our 
views  will  evidently differ  according  to  their  nature  and  the 
theory we hold about the usefulness,productivity, and desirabil-
ity of the various government services. 
It  is clearly necessary to distinguish between different branches 
of government activity.  Not everybody will  consider an AAA 
subsidy  that  induces  a  farmer  to  destroy  or not  to  produce 
wealth a  useful  service.  In many other cases  the usefulness of 
government services cannot be doubted. But even if  we have, in 
a more or less arbitrary way, made up our mind what we con-
sider  useful  and  therefore  constituting a  part of the national 
dividend, it is  still difficult to achieve an absolutely consistent 
treatment. Suppose we  have decided that a certain part of taxes 
is  to be deducted from the taxpayer's income, corresponding to 
that part of government expenditurt": which is considered a mere 
transfer of income, e.g. sums spent on poor and unemployment 
relief. If the same amount were raised,  instead of by taxes,  by 
selling government securities to the same group of people, nobody 
would deduct that amount from the income of the buyer of these 
securities or somebody else's income. 
There is still another difficulty, which, after closer considera-
tion, proves to be a blessing in disguise. If  we consider some types 
ernment investment), it may be a convenient fiction to speak of  government income, 
without allocating it to individuals. But special care must be taken to avoid double 
counting. See also G. C. Means, Part Five, and Clark Warburton, Vo/umt Ont, Part 
Two, Sec. IV. PART  THREE 
of government activity 'productive' or 'useful', that is, as contri-
buting something to national income, and  therefo~e count ex~ 
penditure connected with them as income and do not allow a 
corresponding  deduction  from  taxpayers'  income,  we  should 
sometimes commit an error of double counting. This would be 
the  case  when  these  services  are not directly  consumed,  but 
rather help to  produce something and thus enter the' value of 
goods which, in tum, are counted as part of national income. The 
principle will become clear if we consider an analogy from the 
market sphere.  Suppose  a  producer of,  say automobiles,  buys 
intermediate goods, raw materials, labor, and so on. Naturally 
we cannot put down as part of national income the value of all 
these things together with the gross value of the product, i.e., of 
automobiles.  Exactly the same  principle must hold· for  those 
government services that contribute to the production of goods 
or services that form a  part, directly or indirectly, of national 
income. 
Now there can be no doubt that a large part- I venture to say 
the greater part7--of government services (exclusive of income 
transfers such as poor and unemployment relief) are of this kind, 
are 'cost services' (as Professor Calm says), that is to say, have to 
be classified as producers' goods rather than as consumers' goods. 
This is  undoubtedly true of all the services that directly assist 
business (information services, consular services, etc.), of a large 
part of legal services  (courts),  police,  fighting services, etc.  In 
order to test whether a particular kind of service is a consumers' 
or producers' good, the following question might well be asked: 
suppose the service in question is  discontinued and no impair: 
ment of the production of other goods and services (which form 
a part of the national dividend) results, would the discontinuance 
of those government services be regarded as a loss? If  not, they 
are clearly not regarded as valuable in themselves, but only be-
cause they assist in the production of other services which are 
either valuable in themselves  (consumers' goods)  or contribute 
directly or indirectly to the production of such goods. Of  course, 
in a number of instances the answer to such a question will not 
~ It should  be noted  that this  guess  is  not dependent on  a  radical laissez-fake 
attitude. SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT 
be uniform, but will vary according to personal predilections and 
general outlook. Some people, for example, may attach a value 
to military displays, training, the kind of mental attitude that a 
vast military machinery is  bound to foster, quite irrespective of 
whether the expense can be justified by a rational evaluation of 
internal or external disturbances of the production process which 
are obviated by the existence  or  the  activity  of the military 
machine. But I venture to say that in many cases an agreement 
could be reached.  8 
If once a  certain type of government activity has  been de-
clared as  not having a  value of its own in the sense indicated 
above, but as representing either a mere transfer of income or at 
best a cost service; the·further treatment is unambiguously pre-
determined: we need not find out whether it actu" ally is  produc-
tive, that is  to say,  whether it contributes something to the na-
tional dividend. A  staunch laissez-fairist would deny categori-
cally that government activities can be productive. People with 
less extreme views would consider each case according to its own 
merit. But from the point of view of a computation of national 
income we need not go into that matter, just as we do not and 
need.  not inquire whether each worker, whose income we count 
as part of the national dividend, really contributes a value prod-
uct equal to his wages. Even if he were a saboteur, that is, if  his 
value product were negative, our calculation would not be upset. 
His wage must be put down as his income and will in any case 
be deducted as  cost  from  the value  product of the  firm.  His 
negative  productivity will  automatically find  its  expression  in 
smaller physical output. In the national income calculation it 
will show up  either in decreased 'profits or in higher prices  (if 
output is lower than it otherwise would be) and hence a  lower 
figure of deflated (real) income. 
Similarly, for all cost services of the government Gust as  for 
income  transfers effected  by the government)" a  corresponding 
sum must be deducted. from the taxpayers' income, that is to say, 
their income must be defined  and measured exclusive  of that 
part of taxes which corresponds to the cos" t of such government 
& For an attempt "at a quantitative allocation of government expenditures between 
producers' and consumer's goods see R. W. Nelson and Donald Jackson, Part Six. PART  THREE 
services  (plus transfers). If  it is  held that some (or all) of these 
services contribute nothing, that they do not aid but impede the 
production of wealth, that does not in the least disturb our cal- , 
culation. If  it is  true, then the ouptut of goods will be smaller 
than it otherwise would be and, provided the methods of calcu-
lating national income are otherwise correct and the data com-
plete, that would find its expression in the national income figure 
in a  lower level of money income of certain individuals or in a 
higher price deflator (price index). 
How the cost of  such government services and of income trans-
fers is  to be allocated among different groups of taxes and tax-
payers is  an entirely different question. The allocation must be 
to  a  very large extent arbitrary, because most government ser-
vices  are broad overhead services for  the economy as  a  whole, 
and it is  in many cases  impossible  or even meaningless  to  say 
that  they  contribute  to  ·one  line  of production  rather  than 
another. The allocation among different taxes is in any case only 
of secondary importance. The important thing is  the classifica-
tion of government services. 9 
If  it could be assumed that all government services are of the 
nature of producers' goods,  the computation of national income 
would  be  enormously facilitated;  for  then all  questions of the 
productivity or usefulness of government activity, in principle as 
well as in specific cases, could be neglected as irrelevant. Unfor-
tunately, this is not possible. Many types of government activity 
are certainly rather of the nature of  consumers' goods; e.g., all or 
a  large  part of the services  for  recreation,  education,  health. 
Here the difficulty arises that we have-in most cases-no prices 
of these services. The price index (cost of living index or what-
ever it is)  used  to deflate money incomes does not and cannot 
take account of the prices and changes in the prices of these ser-
vices. We know only the money cost, and, if  money costs rise or 
g Dr. Colm's paper can, it seems  to me, be criticized on this score. He discusses 
first the question of 'Public Revenue in National Income' and speaks of the classi-
fication of public services only later, as if it were of the nature of an afterthought. 
What he says under the first  heading seems to me incon.clusive, if not looked at in 
the light of what follows.  I  see no justification for the postulate that cost services 
should be charged to business taxes rather than income taxes, or that the shifta-
bility Or  the actual shifting of taxes should have anything to do wi.th the questi0I?-
whether the taxpayers income should  be defined inclusive or exclusive of the tax  . . SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT  147 
fall,  that need not imply a  more or less  plentiful supply of the 
services,  but may merely reflect  a  change in the efficiency  of 
rendering them. In the market sphere a change in cost due to a 
change in efficiency  would be corrected by a  change in price 
(assuming correct methods and complete data). 
A  further difficulty arises  from  the welfare point of view  in 
connection with government investments  in durable goods  or 
.construction. Irrespective of whether they are wholly or partly of 
the nature of durable consumers' goods (parks, roads, schools) or 
of producers' goods  (dams, irrigation projects,  office  buildings, 
armaments, etc.) they are usually counted as part of the national 
pro:duct. From a welfare point of view, however, this is justifiable 
only if the works are considered useful or desirable, and if their 
desirability or usefulness is  roughly proportional to their cost;lO 
for what we know is only the cost and not-as in the case of goods 
sold  in the market-the price the consumer is  willing to  pay. 
Thus all the difficulties that could be avoided in the case of cost 
services currently consumed come to the fore. There can be no 
doubt that the solution of these problems cannot but be  very 
rough and will to a large extent depc;nd on value judgments con-
cerning which no general agreement can be expected and which 
are incapable of a rigorous scientific proof. 
II National  ITlCome  and its Components as Instruments 
of Economic  Analysis,  with SPecial  RefereTlCe  to  the 
Relation  between Saving  and Investment 
I  THE PREVAILING TERMINOLOGICAL CONFUSION 
When it comes  to usiJ?g  the concept of national income in eco~ 
nomic analysis, especially in business cycle analysis, fortunately 
many of the difficulties mentioned in the first part of this paper 
can be. avoided; but as we shall see, others take their place. This 
must be attributed to the fact that, although the same words are 
used in economic analysis in general, and cycle analysis in par~ 
10 This has, of course, nothing to do with possible 'secondary' (,multiplier') effects 
of a  policy of public expenditure on output and employment as a  whole. If there 
are such effects- positive or negative-they  would find their expression in a changed 
output of other goods and would thus be taken care of automatically by a correct 
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ticular, as in the computation 9f national mcome for purposes of 
welfare economies, their meaning undergoes a more or less far-
reaching transformation. 
It is not. difficult to find examples. Take as  a first instance the 
problem of government investments  (public  works)  and.  t~eir 
influence on .economic  activity.  This problem has  been much 
discussed  in  recent years  under  the  heading (Investment and 
Consumption', and by some writers a  fairly stable quantitative 
relationship between the two has been assumed. Cmultiplier'). It 
would seem to follow that all the difficulties connected with the 
definition and measurement of the volume of public investment 
mentioned above would be brought to the fore, if the multiplier 
theory were applied to a  specific case and an attempt made to 
find out what the probable consequences of government expendi-
ture on economic activity were likely to be. Fortunately tha~ is 
not so. Whether some types of government expenditure are·.,re-
garded as productive or not, whether they ·are classified as con-
sumption or investment,  whether people  are  paid for  leaning 
against a shovel, for digging holes, for having in some way par-
ticipated  in  the World War  (veterans'  bonus),  for  building a 
dam, or for constructing a road or a battleship is almost entirely 
irrelevant from the point of view of the further effect of such ex-
penditure. In many cases the classification of these types of ex-
pe:nditure  as  consumption or investment expenditures is  quite 
arbitrary,  but forrunately equally irrelevant from the point of 
view of their immediate secondary effects. What matters is  the 
way these expenditures are financed,  whether the successive re-
cipients spend  the money and how quickly they spend it,  the 
existence  of idle  factors  of production in those  branches into 
which the additional demand is  being directed (the absence of 
boule necks), and the avoidance of psychological repercussions. 
It follows  that the statistical application of the multiplier theory 
as it is now current among the Keynes school is not very useful. 
The multiplier states a relationship between investment and con-
sumption, and Mr. Keynes and some of his followers try to draw 
conclusions from the relative magnitude of consumption and in-
vestment in normal years when private, profit-seeking, and p·rice 
motivated investments prevail,  which are then applied to find 
out something about the probable effects of what is more or less SAVINC  AND  INVESTMENT  '49 
arbitrarily  classified  as  'government  investment'.  The  whole 
problem is thereby misconceived and attention diverted from the 
strategic factors indicated above. 
The foregoing remarks, of course, touch but superficially the 
complex  problems  co;"'ected  with  a  public  works  policy.  I 
wanted only tc give a first example of the difference between the 
meaning of such terms as 'investment' in an analysis of the  busi~ 
ness cycle and  their  meaning in national income computation. 
We find,  however,  these disastrous equivocations not only if 
we  apply the concepts  national income,  investment,  consump-
tion,  saving,  etc.,  to  the public sphere of the economic system, 
but also if we confine ourselves to  the market sphere where, on 
the  whole, all  those concepts are less ambiguous. 
.  In  almost  all  current  theories  of economic  fluctuations  the 
relation of saving and investment and the division of the national 
income into its component parts, that is to say, into consumption 
and investment or consumption and saving, playa very impor-
tant role.  It would  seem  tc  follow  that for  all  these  theories 
statistical income computations, especially when they break in-
come into its components,  are  of the greatest value.  Unfortun-
ately, the confrontation of the theories with the facts by means of 
statistical measurements of income,  saving,  investment,  and  so 
on, with a view to verifying or disproving the theories, has so far 
made hardly any progress. 
The reason is  to be found not only and not primarily in the 
inadequacy of the statistical  data,  but in  the  pitiful  confusion 
prevailing in the  theoretical  sphere: different  theorists  use  the 
same words in a different sense, and statisticians in still another. 
Frequently they are not aware of the differences in meaning, and 
in many cases they are not able tc handle their own set of defini-
tions  consistently.  No  wonder  that  statisticians  do  not derive 
much inspiration from  the theory. 
In 'the following pages a short sketch of  some of the concepts of 
saving and investment as developed in recent theoretical litera-
turewill be offered,  with  special reference to statisticalapplicability. 
However, no exhaustive treatment is  contemplated. The litera-
ture  on  the  subject  is  already  too  vast  and  is  still  growing 
rapidly.a 
11 A bibliographical note is appended to  this paper. PART  THREE 
2  THE  CONTROVERSY  OVER THE  DEFINITION  OF  SAVING  AND 
INVESTMENT  , 
Probably no other two concepts have given rise  to so much con-
fusion and discussion in recent years as  saving and investment. 
Are  saving and investment necessarily  equal?  Can there  be a 
difference  between  them? If so,  what does  such  a  difference 
mean? Rowis it to be measured? What are the consequences? 
The fight about these questions is still raging and the pages of 
the various economic periodicals are  filled with the cries of the 
battle. 
It would seem well to begin by recalliog, and to keep io mind,. 
a  few  simple  principles  which,  elementary  though  they  are, 
have not always been observed in the discussion. 
Whether saving and investment are necessarily equal or can 
be different depends on their definition. Without giving a precise 
definition there is no sense to such statements as 'it is a fact that 
saving and investment are equal' o~ 'they are in reality equal or 
unequal'  .12 If  it i~ said, as many writers now say, that saving and 
investment are  necessarily equal under all circumstances:  and 
that their being unequal is absolutely inconceivable, this must be 
so  by definition  and must  be demonstrated  by a  tautological 
transformation of the terms; an appeal to the facts or to experi-
ence is nonsense. In other words, this equality by definition does 
not tell us anything about the real world, but expresses a termi-
nological  convention  about  the  use  of the  symbols  (words). 
Hence there is no sense in using it as a  condition for economic 
equilibrium or  in  postulating  it as  an  objec~ve of economic 
policy. 
Since, however, almost all economists are rather loose in the 
definition of their terms and do not always use them consistently, 
it is not safe to rely solely on the explicit definitions a writer gives; 
we  must also  consider how  he actually uses  his  terms.  And a 
criticism that confines  itself to pointing out that in a  certain 
theoretical system the explicit definition does not fit the proposi-
12  It sounds a  little naive for A. P. Lerner to choose as a title for a paper the cate-
gorical statemcnt; 'Saving Equals Invl::stme::nt',  Quarter/.)' Journal oj &onoml,s, Vol. 
LII  (February  1938),  pp.  !297-309'  An equally  categorical  and  the::rdore::  naive:: 
attirude is  displayed by Joan Robinson in her Introductt'on to tlu  Tluory of Employment 
(London, 193'1) passim. SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT 
tions where the term is  used,  may be very superficial. A  slight 
change in the definition will sometimes not only give sense to the 
propositions where the term is used, but also make them valuable 
statements.  A  fair  and constrUctive  critic  will  investigate  this 
possibility. 
3  THE KEYNESIAN IDENTITY OF SAVING AND INVESTMENT · 
Let us begin with saving and investment in a sense in which"  they 
are necessarily equal. If  (as most writers do) we define the income 
of a period for society as a whole (we shall denote it  from now on 
as  Y)  as  the total output of the period or, more precisely,  the 
money value of the output; if  we define saving, S, as that part of 
the income which is  not consumed, and investment, I, as  the 
addition to the stock of capital, then S and I are identically the 
same thing. We have two symbols for the same magnitude. Both 
S  and I  denote  the unconsumed part of current output. The 
definition and measurement of that magnitude involve, of  course, 
difficult problems such as the determination of the proper amorti-
zation requirements and what is to be understood by maintain-
ing capital intact. The magnitude in question can furthermore 
be expressed in terms of current prices or can be 'deflated', and 
the choice of the proper price index for  deflating current-price 
values presents great difficulties.  However,  all  these difficulties 
and ambiguities concern S and I  ~ike; they cannot give rise to a 
difference between them, for the unconsumed output, after it has 
been defined in one way or the other, is  the same thing whether 
'we call it saving or investment. 
These are, as is well known, Mr. Keynes' definitions as used in 
his  General  Theory,  and so  far he is, of course,  quite right. And 
we  must  admit  that  these  definitions  are the  ones frequently 
given by writers who do not care much about precise definitions, 
but try simply to formulate the everyday meaning of their terms. 
Therefore,  those  writers who want to  speak of differenc~ be-
tween S  and I  must change their definitions.  Otherwise their 
terminology is inconsistent and it is difficult to attach any definite 
sense " to what they are saying when they speak of a  difference 
between S and I. 
I  have said  that Keynes is  right in saying that under these 
definitions S =  1. But, of course, he says much more in this con-PART  THREE 
nection, and much that is not right. First he defines S· and I  as 
identical, but at the same time uses both terms, and neither in-
discriminately  nor for  purely  stylistic  reasons;  then he  keeps 
saying-and that is an integral part of his theory-that I and S 
are (made equal', (are brought into line' by a change in Y. None 
of this makes sense according to his definitions; S and I are eq·ual 
because they.are identical at any mome~t  of time. No adjustment 
is required to make them equal, for  they are different symbols 
for the same thing.13 
But although aggregate S and I are identically the same thing, 
there is  no necessity that for  each individual S  and I  must be 
equal. How is this possible? Does it not prove that the equality of 
S and I  is more than a convention about the use of terms? 
To clear up the situation we  may turn with  profit  to  Mr. 
Lerner's account, since it"  is easily the most precise.14  Y is there 
defined. as  the sum Hof expenditures of all kinds".16 All these V's 
are classified either as C's or Ps, consumption expenditures and 
investment expenditures, i.e., "expenditures on things other than 
consumption  since  these  two  make  up  all  possible  expendi. 
tures".l' I  is  thus defined as V-C. And S is also V-C.  But how 
can S and I  then be un~qual for some individuals? 
The solution is very simple. Each act of expenditure that con-
stitutes Y, and C  or I  at the same time must be allocated to a 
given individual; it must have, so to speak, a personal index-it 
must be income, consumption, or investment of somebody. 
13 That has been pointed out by Myra purds, 'Is Money Saving Equal to Invest- . 
ment', Quarterly Journal oj &onomks, Vol. LI (August 1937), pp. 604-25, by R. G. 
Hawtrey and others. 
14 Loc. dt., p. 298. 
16 Mr. Lerner's description is not quite general,  because there are expenditures 
that are not income expenditures  (interbusiness  transactions,  trans~er payments, 
etc.) and, as  we shall see, it is  not always possible to identify individual acts of ex-
penditure as  income expenditures. But let us  abstract from  these difficulties and 
assume that we  have somehow made a  selection of those expenditures that con-
stitute income. 
IS Loe.  cit.,  p. 2g8. Note that  I  is  defined  only negatively. That all V's must be 
either C's or I's is not the only possible convention in accord with everyday usage 
of the terms. Suppose the government creates money and spends it On  unemploy-
ment relief, then according to the ordinary usage we would say that these expendi-
tures constitute income of the unemployed but neither C  nor I. (The subsequent 
expenditure of these sums by the unemployed constitutes C on the part of the un-
employed  and  Y  on  the part of the receiver of the money.)  Mr. Lerner would 
probably classify that expenditure as an  I-expenditure,  because it is  "on things 
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Now, one and the same act of expenditure constitutes Y of the 
receiver  of money ("the receipt of which  [viz.,  of the payments] 
constitutes all the incomes")I' and C or I  of the spender  of'the 
money. And likewise the S's, although they are made up of the 
same elements as the l's, are not allocated to the same individu-
als  as  the  l's.  Suppose,  e.g.,  an  entrepreneur  pays  wages  to 
workers  who  are  engaged  in  constructing  a  house. Then this 
expenditure constitutes  I  on  the part of the  entrepreneur and 
(so long as the workers have not spent the money) S on the part 
of the workers. When they spend the money the S is  shifted to 
somebody else.18 
Hence'there is nothing mysterious about the fact that S and I 
are the same thing in the aggregate,  but may be unequal for 
particular  individuals.  The purely  conventional  matter  of the 
equality of S and I  is  not in the least affected. 
4  VARIOUS  DEFINITIONS  ACCORDING  TO  WHICH  SAVING  AND 
INVESTMENT NEED NOT BE EQUAL 
Let us discuss now the sense or senses in which saving and invest-
ment can be said to be unequal by sketching the evolution in the 
usage of these words in recent literature. 
a)  Traditional definitions 
We can first distinguish the 'Pre-Keynesian' usage of the terms 
saving  and  investment.  Before  Mr.  Keynes'  Treatise on  M omy 
appeared, economists spoke quite naively and unsophisticatedly 
of differences between Sand 1.  Wicksell and the Neo-Wicksel-
lians,  especially Professor Hayek, and others used that language 
and it was 'adopted by a great many other writers. 
An  excess of investment over  saving was meant to  imply in-
flation. If  all investments during a period are financed by, or are 
equal to,  voluntary saving,  then, so far  as these investments are 
concerned,  no inflation,  that  is,  no increase  in  total  monetary 
demand  for  goods is occurring. If, however,  investment exceeds 
saving,  inflationary  sources  are  being  tapped;  the  excess  is  fi-
nanced  either by newly created  bank credit or  by dishoarding, 
which implies an increase in monetary demand for, and expendi-
ture on, goods in  general. 
17 Lerner, loco  tit., p. ~g8. 
IS That in  this case this account of the matter is  not in  line with the everyday usage 
of the tenDS is another question that will be discussed below under 4 Cd). 154  P  ART  THREE 
On the other hand, saving is said to exceed investment when 
people  hoard or when receipts are used  to extinguish deposit 
money (by repaying bank credits). That part of income which 
people hoard they do not spend on consumption. Hence, on the 
definition  of  saving  as  income  minus  consumption,  what  is 
hoarded  constitutes  saving.  But  these  stuns  are  not spent on 
capital goods; hence they do not constitute investment; hence S 
exceeds 1. An excess of saving implies deflation. 
This language is  irresistibly convenient and seems to express 
. very realistically what actually happens during the prosperity 
and depression phases of the cycle respectively. Nevertheless, it 
conceals difficulties unless the definitions of S and I are different 
from those previously given. It seems that the writers mentioned 
above have not been aware of these difficulties;  this is  at least 
indicated by their failure to give careful definitions of S  and 1. 
We shall see at once that definitions of S and I can be devised that 
fit  perfectly  that convenient language  [see  below  under  (d)]. 
But historically the solution comes a little later. 
b)  Keynes'  early concepts 
The next stage in the doctrinal development is  marked by Mr. 
Keynes'  Treatise  on  Money,  which  has  made  the  catch  worq.s 
'excess.:saving' and 'excess~investment' really popular. He makes 
these two magnitudes playa strategic role in the theory of eco~ 
nomic fluctuations. Mr. Keynes was aware of the fact that under 
the loose  everyRday definition of S  and I  they are necessarily 
equal. He therefore tried to  define his terms very carefully and 
consistently.  Unfortunately,  however,  Mr.  Keynes'  definitions 
rob his terms of all causal significance in 'explaining expansion 
and contraction of output. All such statements, sPTead  through 
the two volumes of the Treatise, as that this or that factor or event 
can produce a favorable or unfavorable effect on output only if 
and so far as  it leads to excess investment or excess saving, are 
reduced to worthless tautologies. Since Mr. Keynes has given up 
the terminology of his  Treatise,  I  need indicate only very briefly 
why that is  soY~ Income is defined as normal income, that is  to 
say, total earnings minus windfall profits (plus negative profits, 
19  Cf. Hawtrey's analysis in  The  Art oj Central -Bariking  (London, 1932), pp. 334 ff. SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT  '55 
i.e., losses). Saving is income minus consumption  .. Investment is 
total earnings minus consumption.  Hence an excess  of saving 
over investment is so defined as to be equal to losses,  and an ex-
cess of investment over saving is by definition equal to profits. In 
turn,  profits  and  losses  are defined  as  that amount by which 
actual  entrepreneurial  income  exceeds,  or  falls  short  of,  that 
level which would leave the entrepreneur under no inducement 
to change the level of output and employment. 
To give an example: inserting all these definitions,  the state-
ment to the effect that the introduction of a protective tariff will 
increase output, only if and so  far as it leads to an excess of in-
vestment over saving, comes to this: "The introducti.on ~ of  a pro-
tective tariff will increase output, only if  and so far as it changes 
entrepreneurial earnings to such an extent that entrepreneurs do· 
increase output"-a proposition that does not take us very far.  , 
c)  E.Yante and ex post concepts 
Another interpretation of a  difference  between saving and in-
vestment  has  been  suggested  by  a  group  of modern Swedish 
writers such as Lindahl, Lundberg, Myrdal, and Ohlin. 
For all the magnitudes concerned-income, consumption, sav-
ing, investment, etc.-they distinguish between an ex ante and an 
ex post sense. Looking back at the end of any period, what Y, 0, 
S, and I  actually were can be measured. In this ex post sense  S 
and I are equal because they are both defined as Y - c. 
From the ex post sense of these concepts the ex ante sense must 
be carefully distinguished, and what is true of the ex post phenom-
ena of a  certain kind need not be true of the corresponding ex 
ante phenomena. The ex ante phenomena are the expectations and 
plans entertained by all the individuals and firms at any point of 
time for  some  period ahead of that point. All members of an 
economic society at any moment of time expect a certain income, 
and plan or intend to spend a certain part of it on consuIl!-ption 
and to save another part. The entrepreneurs expect certain prices 
to rule, a  certain demand situation, interest rates, etc., and on 
the  basis  of these  expectations they plan a  certain amount of 
investment. 
Summing up the expected incomes, the planned consumption, 
the planned savings, and investments of  all individuals, we arrive PART  THREE 
at the ex ante magnitudes of these phenomena for  t~e economy as 
a whole.2o 
ecThere  is  no reason," accordiI)g to Professor Ohlin, ecfor  as· 
suming that [planned saving and planned investment] should be 
equal. But when the period is finished,  (realized] investment is 
equal to [realized] savings. How does this equality ccome about'? 
The answer is  that the inequality of Sa  [ex  ante  saving1  and Ia 
[ex ante investment] sets in motion a process which makes realized 
income  differ  from  expected  income,  realized  savings  from 
planned savings, and realized new investment differ from the co-
responding plan. These differences we can call: unexpected income,  .  . 
unexpected  new  investment  and unintentional  sav£ngs  .  .  . The busi"" 
ness man who, after the closing of his accounts, finds that he has 
had a larger net income than he expected and that therefore the 
surplus  over  and  above  his  consumption  is  greater  than  his 
planned savings,  has provided cunintentional savings'  which is 
equal to this extra surplus. Unexpected new investment, which, 
like unintentional saving, may, of course, be negative, can.  mean 
simply that stocks  at the end of the period are different from 
what the entrepreneur expected .... 
"Assume that people decide to  reduce  their savings  and in-
crease their consumption during the next period by I 0  million, 
as compared with the realized savings and consumption during 
the period which has just finished  .  .  .  Assume further that the 
planned investment is  equal to  the realized investment during 
the last period." (Since realized saving and realized investment are 
equal, the assumption implies that ex ante saving falls short by IO 
million of ex  ante investment.) "What will be the result? Retail 
sales of consumption goods will rise 10 million and  th~ stocks of 
retailers will at the end of the period be down, e.g., 7 million, the 
remaining 3 million being the extra [unexpected] income of the 
retailers.21  This latter sum is  cunintentional' savings. Thus real-
20 No critical examination of the whole approach will be attempted, although it 
badly needs  clarification and modification in several respects.  After all,  it is  not 
expectations, that is,  purely psychological phenomena, but actions, that influence 
and change  the situation.  People are,  on the whole,  not so  much influenced  by 
other people's expectations,  as  by their actual behavior.  Therefore,  in order  to 
achieve complete clarity and precision, it will be  necessary for the authors of that 
theoretical schematism to indicate  how the psychological concepts can be inter-
pre.ted by, or translated into, behavioristic terms. 
21  Profes~or Ohlin obviously assumes that retailers have put up prices  to such an SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT 
ized  saving  is  down only  7  million,  or  the  same  amount as 
realized investment.,,22 Realized investments are down, because 
the depletion of stocks by 7 millions is counted as unintentional 
or unexpected disinvestment.  23 
Similarly, other cases of an ex ante .difference between S and I 
can be analysed. "When the State finances public works with the 
printing of new notes,  the increased investment is  matched  [ex 
post]  by increased  'real'  savings"  although ex  ante  investments 
were  in  excess  of  savings,  because no  planned  saving corre-
sponded to the planned government investment. "At the end of 
the period some  people hold more cash than at its beginning. 
This is evidence that they have had an income which they have 
not consumed,  i.e.,  that  they have saved.  Ex post  there  is  ex 
dejinit£one  equality between savings and investment."24 
Mr. Hawtrey's analysis  is  similar.  He distinguishes between 
'designed' or 'active' investment, on the one hand, and 'unde-
signed' or 'passive' investment, on the other. Their sum is  total 
investment and saving ('increment of unconsumed wealth'). De-
signed investment is defined as the voluntary acquisition of items 
of unconsumed wealth in the expectation that. they will  be re-
munerative. This is evidently what Mr. Ohlin calls ex ante invest-
ment. Undesigned investment is defined as an "increment of un-
consumed wealth which is  not acquired  voluntarily in the ex-
pectation of its being remunerative. This will be an involuntary 
accumulation of unsold goods"-Professor Ohlin's unexpected 
extent that the increased demand of IO  million has reduced stocks  (measured  in 
old prices) by 7 million. 
22 Bertil Ohlin, &onomic Journal, Vol. XLVII (March 1937), pp. 64-6. Italics as in 
" the original. 
!S This analysis involves the assumption that the supply of investible funds from 
other sources than current saving is  elastic. In other words, that the money supply 
in the form, for example, of bank. credit, is quite elastic, that the banks are prepared 
and able to finance the investment plans, even if consumption expenditure rises. 
Otherw~e the planned  invesnnents could not go  ahead  undisturb" ed  by the fact 
that people spend more On  consumption. This assumption about the elastic "money 
supply may be reasonable, especially if the period in question is sufficiently short; 
but it should be made explicit. It may not be correct and if it is  not, the rate of 
interest will rise so much that the investment plans will be sufficiently scaled down. 
This may very well lead to more or less  serious disturbances in the capital goods 
industries, as analysed by Professor Hayek in his various writings. These considera-
tions suggest that Professor Hayek's theory can be well expressed with the help of 
the Swedish terminological apparatus. 
U  Ohlin, {oc. cit.,  p. 69. PART  THREE 
investment.  HPassive  investI:TIent  may be a  negative  quantity; 
that is  to  say,  active investment may exceed saving,  and  the 
excess  will  be represented  by an  undesigned disinvestment or 
decrement of stocks of. unsold goods. Thus active investment and 
saving (  =  total investment) may be unequal. If  they are, the 
resulting undesigned increment Or  decrement of unsold goods 
will be a source of disequilibrium, leading to a decrease or an in-
crease  In  productive  activity  and  possibly  also  in  the  price 
level."~6 
d) Robertson's definition oj saving and £,westment 
D. H. Robertson has proposed a set of definitions that allows us 
to speak of differences between S and I and comes very near to, 
or even makes explicit, what is  meant when the terms are used 
in the unsophisticated way outlined above under (a). 
The discussion of a  simple case will show that the definitions 
that make S =  I  (saving is  income minus consurription; income 
is the value of total output; investment is output minus consump-
tion), although they sound very familiar,  lead sometimes to very 
strange26 results which are avoided  by Mr. Robertson's defini-
tions. 
Suppose somebody, the government or a private firm, spends 
money on the construction of something that is  considered an 
investment, say, a road, and the money is  created ad hoc by the 
26 Capital and Employment (London, 1937), pp. 176-7. Mr. Hawtrey's analysis avoids 
some obscurities that attach to Professor Ohlin's theory. Designed invesments are 
actual investments. They exist not only in the plans but can in principle at least, 
be registered ex post. Ohlin, in a later article, 'Alternative Theories of the ~te  of 
Interest', Econom;c  Journal,  Vol. XLVII (1937),  p. 423,  characterizes the ex  ante 
concepts of  S and I as meaning the same as demand ,and supply schedules for saving. 
Ex post S and I are then actual demand and supply as determined by the intersec-
tion of the schedules. It is, however, difficult to see how one can speak of the differ-
ence between ex ante S  and I, if  S  and I  ex  ante  are schedules. There is,  theD,  in 
reality,  a  whole  series  of differences,  corresponding  [0  a  series  of hypothetical 
interest rates.  When Ohlin speaks  of the  difference  between ex  ante  S  and I, he 
probably means the difference corresponding to that rate ofinterest which actually 
obtains in the market (the rate of interest being determined by the intersection of 
the demand and supply curve of credit of which the curves relating to ex ante S and 
I constitute a part). This difference is  then not only an ex ante, but an ex post phenom-
enon as well, being the same thing as Hawtrey's undesigned investment which was 
clearly foreshadowed in D. H. Robertson's 'induced lacking', Banking Policy and the 
Pria Level (London, 1926), Ch. V. 
U  Strange in the sense of being in contradiction to general, unsophisticated usage. SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT  159 
banks or comes from hoards (idle deposits). The new money  is 
paid out as wag~  to the workers engaged, either directly on the 
spot or indirectly  in the  industries  that provide  material  and 
machinery for  the  construc'tion  of the  road,  and  the  workers 
spend what they receive on consumers' goods.  The unsophisti-
cated will say there is investment but no saving, the investment 
being financed by 'inflation'. No,  says  the sophisticated econo-
mist. Saving must be equal to investment. But where is the sav-
ing? Mi. Harrod informs us that Hfor a few days the whole of the 
net investment may be financed by the savings of those who. re-
ceive that money;  before  they begin to spend the money they 
save what they receive".  27 The worker who receives his weekly 
wage on, say,  Saturday afternoon and has no  opportunity  to 
spend it during the night and refrains from spending it on Sunday 
saves it. When he spends it gradually during the following week 
on consumption, he gradually dissaves and, presumably, the re-
tailer save it if  he raises the price of his wares and thus makes a 
profit. If  he depletes his stocks, he disinvests and this disinvest-
ment wipes out the original investment. 
This account of the matter sounds very strange, but it follows 
from the definitions given above. The income of the worker in-
creases by the whole amount of the wage, when the wage is paid 
out. Consumption does not rise at once. Therefore, Y - C  =  S 
has risen by the whole amount. 
There can be no doubt that this is very confusing and unusual 
terminology. It amounts to the substitution of the terms 'saving' 
and 'dissaving' for 'receiving' and "spending' money. But. we do 
not ordinarily call it 'saving' if people refrain from spending their 
money income immediately, that is  to say, if they keep it for  a 
little while, paying it out at discrete intervals. Only if  money is 
not spent on consumption for a longer period than is dictated by 
the length of the income period is it said  to be saved or hoarded. 
It should be noted that this discontinuity of income payments, 
and of payments in general, is an essential feature of a  money 
economy. A shortening of the income period and other payment 
periods  implies  an  increase  in  the  velocity  of  circulation  of 
money.28 If the income period approaches zero, the velocity of 
11  Tlu Tradl Cyell  (Oxford, 1936), p. 7'1. 
IS Historically that happened to an extreme extent at the height of the Gennan in· 
Ration  in  19'1'l~3, when incomes were  paid out daily and, for  a  while,  twice a PART  THREE 
circulation rises to infinity and any finite quantity of circulating 
money raises the price level. to infinity. In other words,  a  con· 
tinuous  money income stream is  incompatible  wit,h  a  money 
economy. A  perfectly continuous money  income stream is  a  con-
tradictio in  adJecto. 
Mr. Robertson takes  care of that fact  in his definitions.  By 
adopting a  'period analysis',  he introduces explicitly from the 
beginning the discontinuity of the income streams. He assumes 
that money received 'today' is  available for expenditure only on 
the next 'day'. A 'day' may be a little longer than a day, say, a 
week. That depend~ on the payment habits. For any day he dis-
tinguishes, accordingly, between disposable and earned income  .. 
The  ~isposable income is the earned income of the preceding day, 
and the earned income that is paid out today becomes disposable 
tomorrow. 
.  Saving for any day is defined as disposable  iocome of the same 
day minus consumption expenditure of the same day. 
Investment, on the other hand, is defined as actual expendi-
ture on investment goods during the day. Hence investment can 
be greater than saving because money may be spent out of other 
sources than disposable income. Expenditure may be made from 
newly created bank money or from hoards. This money becomes, 
of course, earned income on the same day and disposable income 
on the following day. Thus an excess of lover S, on the one hand, 
implies an increase of today's (earned) income over yesterday's 
(earned) income. An excess of S over I, on the other hand, im-
plies a  decre~e of today's income as compared with yesterd~y' s 
income. Evidently, if  it is said in an unsophisticated way that any' 
excess of lover S must be financed by 'inflation', precisely this is 
meant: inflation is  defined as  an increase in income,  in other 
words, in MV (V being the income velocity of money). 
Thus a set of definitions can be developed that gives precision 
and consistency to what I  have called the unsophisticated usage 
of the terms S and I.  29 
day. Hence prices rose much faster than the quantity of money. This was reflected 
in a decline of the 'real' value (in terms of general purchasing power or of gold) of 
the total quantity of  money to a small fraction of its normal level. (From this fact that 
the quantity of money in terms of gold decreased, some German economists, e.g., 
Karl Helferich, concluded that there was no inflation in Germany at that time!) 
U  It is interesting that Myra Curtis in her brilliant article (loe.  cit.) applies a period SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT 
A few further remarks seem to be in order. Mr. Robertson uses 
income here in the sense of actual money income involving mone-
tary transactions (a transfer of money),  in contradistinction to 
income in the sense of the money value of real goods.:lO Evidently 
the two concepts do not coincide and should be clearly distin-
guished. 31  Professor Ohlin, for example, says that income, in his 
sense,  "has nothing to do with  the actual receipt  of cash".  32 
Thus, money income in Mr. Robertson's sense is no longer rigidly 
linked by definition with the value of output. 
The two magnitudes need not coincide, because income in the 
sense of money value of output comprises items that do not give 
rise to monetary transactions e'imputed' income or 'bartered' in-
come). But even if ail  transactions of goods took the shape of 
purchases for)  and sales against, money, there would be certain 
discrepancies between the two types of income, because money 
incomes are received at discrete intervals while real income flows 
more continuously.  Furthermore, if new  money is created and 
handed  to,  s~y,  an unemployed  person  or to an  official,  this 
might  be called  money  income of the unemployed  person or 
analysis a la Robertson, apparently without being aware of this fact (at least, she 
does not mention Mr. Robertson's name) and, unfortunately, without making the 
distinction between successive short periods sufficiently explicit. That it is  implicit 
in her analysis can be easily demonstrated. She speaks, for example, of "expendi-
ture not out of income" which is "included in Y but not in I or C" (p. 610), I and 
C  being defined  as expenditure out of income on  investment and  consumption, 
respectively. The income 'out of which' people spend during a period is evidently 
Mr. Robertson's disposable income, and the income that is created by expenditure 
(out of income and not out of income) is  the earned income of the period. 
There \s,  however, one difficulty about Miss Curtis' scheme that is not present in 
Mr. Robertson's analysis. It is true that it can be objectively ascertained whether 
today',  (earned)  income is  greater or smaller than  yesterday's  income,  in Miss 
Curtis' words, whether there has been "expenditure not out of income" or whether 
"income has  been  withheld from expenditure"  (has been hoarded). But how can 
we  allocate the difference to C  and I? How can  we say, for  example, that an ex-
penditure not out of income was on consumption rather than on investment, or 
vice versa? Evidently, neither an individual piece of money nor an individl,lal act 
of expenditure can be identified as 'coming out of income' or 'not out of income'. 
These are non-operatiorial concepts, figurative language. What we can do is  com-
pare Y, C,  and I  in successive periods; but that should be sufficient to build up 
the definitions and to describe the process completely in all its details. 
"Undeflated, that is,  in current  prices, or deflated  by any sort of a  price index 
number. 
U  A  corresponding distinction should  be made for  saving and  (perhaps)  for  in-
vestment. 
u &onDmic Jornno1,  Vol. XLVII ([93'1), p. 65. [62  PART  THREE 
official.  Before  the money is  spent by the unemployed  or the 
official on goods or services,  there is no increase in the value of 
output corresponding to this income item. For a  longer period 
these discrepancies between money income and value of output 
tend to become unimportant (because of the overlapping of per-
iods at the beginning and end they never disappear completely), 
but in a  microscopic analysis of the type into which the saving-
investment controversy has led, they cannot be neglected. 
In the case, of non-wage and non-salary incomes, the concept 
of actual money income gives  rise  to further difficulties which 
make it impossible to define it  .withou~ some reference to the real 
side of income. Not all  money r'eceipts  and expenditures of a 
firm  are income receipts and expenditures. Which part of the 
total flow  of money is  to  be regarded " as the income flow  and 
which as  'intermediate transactions' can be defined only with 
reference to the 'real' sphere.  But even if this has been accom-
plished  satisfactorily,  it is  in many cases  not possible,  without 
more or less arbitrary conventions, to identify individual trans-
actions (either the (real' or the corresponding (monetary' tran-
sactions) as income or non~income  transactions. It  is, for example 
not under all circumstances admissible  to  regard  all  purchases 
of consumers'  goods  by the final  consumer as income transac-
tions, because consumption might exceed income (that is, capital 
consumption or disinvestment might.take place). Nor is it possi-
ble to identify an individual purchase of a capItal good as con-· 
stituting new investment or replacement, that is, as belonging or 
not belonging to the income sphere. Income and new investment 
can be determined only in the aggregate, as residuals, by deduct-
ing from total output consumption and what is ·considered neces-
sary for maintaining the capital stock intact.  33 
These complications are, however, not insuperable, although 
no attempt has been made in this paper to elaborate the analysis 
so as to take care of them and to include all non-income ·tran-
sactions in a  coherent scheme of definitions. 
e)  A  hybrid definition of 'excess saving' 
A  peculiar and unusual definition of S and I  is  implied by the 
U  The definition and, a fDrtiDri,  the measurement of the latter item present very 
great difficulties in themselves.  Fortunatdy, however,  for  many purposes a  gross 
definition of income and investment seems sufficient. SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT 
statistical  measures  employed  in  the  well  known  Brookings 
study." What there is called a difference between S and I is not 
identical with anyone of the various m~anings  of the ambiguous 
terms analysed above. 
The Brookings studies have been subjected to  very elaborate 
and destructive criticism. 35 Here only one point will be touched 
upon. For 1929  the  Brookings  study calculates an excess  of S 
over I of 10.3 billion, and similarly for the preceding years. Since 
this was a  period of rapid expansion, this result is paradoxical. 
On ,the  Robertsonian  or  Swedish-Hawtreyian  definition  one 
should expect in prosperity years I to run ahead of S. The main. 
reason for Mr. Moulton's striking result is his treatment of capital 
gains.36  Realized capital gains are added to  the  income figure 
and hence to saving. Unrealized capital gains are, however, ex-
cluded from income. 
This differentiation between realized and unrealized capital 
gains  would seem  to  be  hardly justifiable.  Suppose  A  owns  a 
capital asset that has risen in price. He sells it to B and realizes a 
capital gain which he spends on consumption, while he invests 
an amount corresponding to the. original value of the asset and 
thereby keeps intact the nominal value of his capital. Hence Ns 
income and consumption have risen by the same amount and his 
saving is  zero. B's saving, on the other hand, is equal to the new 
value of the asset. 
Now suppose that A does not sell the asset, but keeps it. B,  on 
the other hand, saves and invests an amount equal to the original 
value of the asset and consumes an amount equal to  the (un-
realized) capital gain. Evidently as far as the market is concerned 
A  and B together have bought consumption goods and invest-
ment goods to exactly the same extent as in the first case. A con-
solidated balance sheet of both should show the same amount of 
H cr. mainly H. G. Moulton, The Formation ojCapital (1935), and the other volumes 
of that series: Amen"ea's Capacity to Produ£t (1934), Ameri,a's Capaaly to Consume (1934), 
in&ome and Ec01lJ)mi, Progress  (1935)' 
" cr. A. F. Burns, 'The Brookings Inquiry into Income Distribution and Progress', 
Quarterly Journal  oj Economies,  Vol.  L  (1935-36), p. 476,  and  H. H. Villard, 'Dr. 
Moulton's  Estimates of Saving and  Investment\  American  Economi,  Review,  Sep-
tember 1937· 
n  For  a  similar  interpretation  of the  Brookings  result  see  Warburton,  Volume 
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S,  C, and Y  as in the first  case.  According to Mr.  Moulton's 
method, however, we get in the second case a  decrease in S by 
the amount of the capital gain as  compared with the first case. 
It is difficult to see what the significance of this difference is. 
There is,  however, a more serious objection. A's capital gain 
is  c~unted as an increment ofY, and, given 0, of S. On the other 
hand, B's expenditure on the asset in question is  not counted as 
I, because I  is  measured by the value of new investment goods. 
In other words, realized capital gains are S but not I. It  is  diffi~ 
cult to  give  an  economic  interpretation  to  the  results  of  the 
procedure. 
5  STATISTICAL AP PLICABILITY 
The question may now be asked whether it is possible to measure 
statistically saving and investment and differences between them 
in anyone of these various meanings of ~he terms. 
a)  There will hardly be disagreement with the conclusion that 
saving and investment in the ex ante sense could not well be mea-
sured, even if the concepts were defined with perfect precision in 
operational terms which, as we have seen, they are not. 
b)  The concepts of S  and I, as  defined by Mr. Keynes in his 
Treatise  on  Money,  are so  unusual and depend so much on the 
peculiar definition of income exclusive of profit, profit being de-
fined in a very special sense, that they too are not susceptible of 
statistical measurement. 
c)  Mr. Robertson's concept of the difference between S  and I 
hinges on the distinction of very short periods. These periods are 
not the same for all types of income and payment; they change 
over time and overlap. Although, in my opinion, this terminologi~ 
cal apparatus is  extremely  useful  or even indispensable  for  a 
microscopic theoretical analysis, it does not lend itself to macros-
copic statistical measurement. This, however, by no means pre-
cludes the desirability and usefulness  of a  statistical analysis of 
certain phenomena analysed microscopically by Mr. Roberston,· 
e.g., of  the hoarding process. But it need not be done under the 
heading of a difference between Sand 1. 
d)  Statistically speaking I  should, for society as a  whole, define 
S and I identically as unconsumed output. This, again, does not 
exclude the possibility of approaching that magnitude from dif-SAVING  AND  INvESTMENT 
ferent sides; say, from the money side, by calculating money in-
come of individuals  and deducting consumption expenditure, 
and, from the real side, by measuring the output of new capital 
goods and of consumers' goods, respectively. That is what, for 
example, Jakob Marschak and Walter Lederer in their  book 
Kapitalbildung do. They try to measure what they call 'Geldkapi-
talbildung' and 'Realkapitalbildung', capital formation from the 
real and from the money side. 
These two measures will never be the same, but the difference 
is  by no means a measure of the difference between S and I  in 
anyone of the theoretical meanings distinguished above; it is 
entirely due to differences in the reliability and completeness of 
the statistical data used in the two procedures. 
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I  M.  A.  COPELAND 
It is difficult to read Dr. Haberler's admirabl~ summary of the 
controversy  over  the  relationships  between  saving  and  invest-
ment without getting the impression  that various theorists, hav-
ing become conunitted  to the view that the difference between 
saving and investment is significant for an understanding of busi-
ness fluctuations, have each sought to find a tenable meaning for 
this difference. 
A  clear understanding of the relationship between these  two 
concepts seems to me to call for  a recognition of the fact that in-
vestment represents the value of the increase in asset items on the 
consolidated national balance sheet, and saving, the value of the 
increase  in  equity items.  When these  two concepts are  so  con-
ceived,  it is  clear that if saving and investment are consistently 
defined and evaluated for a given community and period, they 
will necessarily be equal. They are not, however, identical. The 
measurement of saving  and  of investment  in  such  a  way  that 
they shall be defined and evaluated consistently is, indeed,  ex-
tremely difficult. Dr. Warburton has given an able statement of. 
the difficulties involved.l 
Consistency of definition and valuation and hence equality of 
actual  saving and  investment is,  of course,  an  integral  part of 
such a view as  that of Ohlin which rests essentially on disting-
uishing a record  of past events from  a statement of future ,esti-
mates. With the insistence of this type of view on the necessity for 
a  careful  distinction between  ex  ante  and  ex  post  analysis  I  am 
in full  agreement, as I am with the conclusion that in retrospect 
actual  saving  and  actual  investment  for  any  past  period  are 
necessarily equal, provided they are consistently difined. But the propo-
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sition that planned saving and planned investment often differ 
significantly am~  the implication that unexpected i~vestment and 
unintentional saving arise only out of such a difference2 seem to 
me to imply a condition contrary to fact. This proposition and its 
implication appear to assume that for some advance period of 
significant length a budget or plan exists for each item of saving 
and for each item of investment to be made in the community; 
and incidentally, that the plans for saving and the plans for in-
vestment are made largely independently. 
In commenting upon the criticism, sometimes leveled against 
the older type of economic theory, that it is an DverrationalizaM " 
tion of human behavior,]. M. Clark has noted that one interpre-
tation of this criticism is  that man is not ubiquitously a  budget~ 
making anirnal. I submit that a theory of the business cycle that 
assumes  the  budgeting of all saving  items and the somewhat 
separate budgeting of all investment items in a community even 
for a period as short as a week assumes that man is a great deal 
more of a budget-making animal than is actually the case. Many 
investments and a larger number of  saving items are not planned 
very far iI?- adva" nce.3 
If  we are to interpret busi.p.ess cycles in tenns of budgets, there 
seems reason for  considering  a  variety of discrepancies  rather 
than concentrating on the discrepancy between budgeted sav-
ings and budgeted investments; for example, for considering the 
discrepancy between budgeted commodity sales and actual com-
modity sales.  There is  also  so~e reason to urge that business 
fluctuations arise not so  much tx:;cause  a  complete set of saving 
2 See Economic Journal,  Vol. XLVII (March 1931), p. 65. 
'Ohlin has foreseen the possibility of a criticism of the type here offered on this one 
aspect of his theory. In a brief note (Economic Journal, XLVII, 426) he tells  us that 
he  hopes that every reader who feels  that his  assumption of planned saving and 
planned investment is  unrealistic will  ask himself whether this criticism does not 
involve the whole analysis of price in tenns of supply and demand schedules. He 
appears to think of such schedules as  consisting of budgets or p" lans. I suggest that 
supply and demand schedules need not be so  conceived. Without renouncing my 
privilege of criticizing schedule analysis on other grounds, I suggest that it does not 
necessarily depend on the assumption that man is  a budget-making animal. Differ-
ent demands  (supplies) at different prices may be thought of simply as different 
conventional or habitual responses to differing social stimuli. The relationship be-
tween a  particular amount demanded and  a  particular demand  price  is  thus a 
special instance of the relation between response and stimulus. DISCtJSSION  [69 
budgets and an uncoordinated complete .set of investment bud-
gets exist as because budgetary practice is still relatively new and 
far from universal.  Further development of budgetary practice 
by both governments and private corporationS  is  likely  in the 
course of time to lead to the putting together of these budgets 
into  an  approach toward  a  consolidated  budget for  the  com-
munity. Such a development may well prove to have a definitely 
stabilizing influence on business fluctuations. 
Robertson's view of the distinction between saving and invest-
ment, with which Dr. Haberler is  apparently in general agree-
ment, I  find somewhat elusive.  Indeed at this writing I  am un-
certain how far the agreement between these two writers extends. 
I  shall confine my remarks to Dr. Haberler's statement. His as-
sertion that such a view is apparently needed to avoid the Hvery 
confusing and unusual terminology"  involved in Harrod's posi-
tion  [II 4Cd)]  is  not entirely convincing. If  individuals increase 
their holdings of cash, or of 'deposit currency'  (without decreas-
ing their holdings of other equities),  this increase may fairly be 
construed as a form of saving. But the illustration employed.  to 
show that this statement involves (confusing and unusual tenni-
nology'  [II,  4Cd)]  deals with a  case where individuals increase 
their holdings of cash temporarily, owing to the periodic char-
acter of payments of wages, etc. The question whether there is a 
temporary saving by recipients of wages paid on a weekly basis 
during the early part of the week may be put in these terms: does 
the increase in the cash holdings of individuals due to payment 
of wages  take place without a  corresponding decrease in other 
equities held by individuals? If  two consolidated national balance 
sheets were set ·up, one representing the condition immediately 
before payment of wages and the other representing the condi-
tion immediately after, there is no reason to assume that the pay-
ment of w~ges would involve a net increase in the total equities 
held by individuals. If  accounts are kept on an accrual basis the 
increase in cash holdings would be offset  by a  decrease in the 
accrued payroll liabilities due wage earners. If  the accounts are 
not kept on an accrual basis the increase in cash holdings of in-
dividuals would be offset by a decrease in proprietorship equities. 
In  other words, the debit entry corresponding to the credit to cash 
on account of wage  payments would  presumably be either a PART  THREE 
charge to accrued payroll liabilities or a charge to profit and I,oss, 
In neither case does the increase in cash holdings of individuals 
represent a net increase in the total equities held by individuals. 
No one would contend-that a mere change in the form of equity 
held by individuals represented saving, 
So far as I  can see,  the view offered to avoid 'confusing and 
unusual terminology' involves  the use  of two  unnecessary and 
misleading  terms,  'disposable  income'  and 'income velocity of 
money', and the affirmation and subsequent apparent denial of 
the same  proposition.  Whether  this  apparent contradiction  is 
actual rests on a question .of interpretation. The crucial proposi-
tion is 
[)  Money income received 'today' is disposable or available for 
expenditure only on the next day. 
The two  terms  the  need  for  which  I  question are defined  as 
follows: 
2)  Today's 'disposable income' equals yesterday's income; and 
3)  'The income velocity of money' equals income divided by the 
quantity 'of money. 
Saving is defined and investment is characterized as foHows: 
4)  Disposable income minus consumption equals saving; that is, 
yesterday's income  minus  todays'  consumption equals  tod~y's 
saving. 
5)  Investment is  equal to saving plus money spent out of other 
sources than disposable income. 
For simplicity we shall, in what follows, consider only the case 
where the money spent out of these  other sources is  a  positive 
quantity. The money spent from these  other sources is  said to 
represent expenditures made from newly created bank money or 
from hoards. Having recourse to this two fold source, either M or 
V, is equivalent to saying: 
6)  If  today's income is larget;" than yesterday's, then in addition 
to disposing of today's disposable income  (yesterday's income) 
the community disposes today of an additional sum arising from 
(a) an increase in the quantity of money if the income velocity 
of money is no larger for  today than for  yesterday, or from (b) 
an increase in the income velocity of money if the quantity of 
money is  no larger today than it was yesterday, or else from (c) 
increases in both the quantity of money and its income velocity, if 
both increase. DISCUSSION 
This proposition (6)  is an elaborate way of saying that more 
income is disposed of today than the amount of today's disposa-
ble income (yesterday's income), The' amount of income disposed 
of today as distinguished from the amount of today's 'disposable 
income'  (i.e.,  yesterday's  income)  is  evidently  today's  income. 
Thus we  are  told  an excess  of lover S implies  an  increase  of 
today's income over yesterday'S  income, presumably an increase 
equal to' the excess of lover S. 
Proposition (6)  is  also an elaborate way of saying that the re-
sulting excess of today's investment over today's saving (or excess 
of today's investment over yesterday's income minus today's con-
sumption) is independent of the quantity of money, The careful 
limitation of income to  money income lends plausibility to  the 
assertion of a relationship  between the quantity of money and 
the  quantity  of income,  but  mathematically  the  form  of the 
statement might be characterized" as 'too true  to  be any good';4 
for proposition (6) regarding M and V (V=  ~) would be equally 
true if M  represented the number of marriages in Maryland or 
any other variable selected at random. 
Thus  the  argument is  reduced  to  the  proposition  that  the 
amount  of income  disposed  of today  exceeds  the  amount  of 
today's disposable income by the amount by which today's in-
come exceeds yesterday's income. In other words,  today's entire 
income is disposed of today. The apparent contradiction between 
. this  and proposition  (I)  may be  resolved  if we  interpret  the 
terms  'investment'  and  'disposable  income'  appropriately.  I 
think  the usc:  of the word  'today' to stand for  a time  period of 
unspecified length lends ambiguity to the time reference of the 
items, saving,  investment, etc. 5 The word 'investment' suggests 
that 'today' is viewed in the past tense. The term 'disposable in-
come' suggests that 'today' is viewed in  the future  tense. When 
we are  speaking of disposable income then we· may assume we 
are  speaking  of estimates  of consumption  and  savings  for  the 
period called 'today', made in advance of that period. When we 
speak of investment, however, we may assume  that we refer  to 
an  historical  statement  of the  amount  of investment  during  the 
period called 'today', made after 'today'  has elapsed, I  suggest 
4  Cf.  Ohlin, &onomie Journal, XL  VII, 69. 
5 I do not think Robertson's own statement involves ambiguity in  time reference. PART  THREE 
that our apparent contradiction may be resolved if we rephrase 
propositions  (4)  and ' (5),  stripped of unnecessary verbiage,  as 
follows: 
7)  Budgeted saving plus budgeted consumption for today equals 
yesterday's  ~ncome, 
8), Budgeted saving. for  today may not turn out to equal actual 
investment today. 
The above comments on Ohlin's view are, of course, applicaM 
ble to this interpretation unless indeed the period called a  day 
is  very  much  shorter  than  twentyMfour  hours.  Man is  not  yet 
ubiquitously a budget-making animal. 
II  HANS  NEISSER 
I  INCOME EX ANTE AND DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES 
Professor Haberler concluded his illuminating survey with skepM 
tical remarks on the possibility of evaluating statistically the vol-
ume of saving ex ante. Moreover, even his discussion of the theoreti-
cal content of this concept and of the basic concept of income ex 
ante may have left the reader puzzled as  to which concept of inM 
come  ex  ante  should  be  accepted  in  analytical  work.  In these 
respects  the  ex  ante  concepts compare unfavorably  with  the  ex 
post concept of income,  which is  both  theoretically precise and 
susceptible of statistic~~.l measureme,nt.  The question thus arises 
whether in theoretical analysis the concepts of income ex ante and 
saving ex  ante are really needed. 
Two services are performed by ex ante concepts in the body of 
modern economic doctrine: first,  the concept of income ex ante is 
designed  to  explain  the  amount  of actual  demand  for  goods, 
services, and investment, at a certain price for  the item; second, 
a  comparison of saving  ex  ante  with investment  is  supposed  to 
indicate whether an economic system  is  in  an 'inflationary' or 
'deflationary' state. 
With respect to the first problem, a few remarks will suffice to 
show that none of the different concepts of income can serve as 
a satisfactory basis for  the theory of demand. Income ex post in-
cludes unexpected profits or losses, which, by their very nature, 
cannot  influence  th~ entrepreneurs'  demand  during  the  income DISCUSSION  '73 
period itseIf.l Keynes' income concept, in the Treatise,  which ex-
cludes windfall profits and  losses,  encounters the difficulty  ~hat 
the borderline between expected and unexpected profits cannot 
be  drawn distinctly.2 As  to  income ex  ante  concepts,  'expected 
income'  obviously does not govern demand, since  present de-
mand is  largely cash demand, and therefore depends upon the 
means available to the buyer, while his willingness to borrow for 
consumptive purposes is  contingent not only on  the size of his 
income of the next period but also on the certainty with which it is 
expected.  'Robertsonian'  income  (=  'yesterday's'  earnings) 
would determine today's buying only if not known in advance, 
Le., on yesterday morning; for if  earnings are not only known but 
even paid in advance,  the income receiver feels  entitled  to  use 
them during the day in which they are to be earned. 
There is no way out of these difficulties except to describe de-
mand as a function of  several variables, none of which should be 
singled out by labeling it 'income ex ante'. The following variables 
would be included in this function:  . 
a)  Yesterday's income ex post: so far  as paid at the end of the 
preceding income period, it will influence today's demand, even 
though it differs from the income expected for today. 
b)  Income expected for today if paid in advance. 
c)  Income expected for today if  not paid in advance. 
aa) If  expected with reasonable certainty, 
bb) If associated with either available money funds  of the 
income recipient or with adequate credit facilities. 
The spending function will also  be influenced by income ex-
pected in the more distant future, because sudden fluctuations in 
yesterday's and today's income, if  considered short-lived, are usu-
ally not allowed to affect spending as much as saving. 
The list does  not claim completeness and certainly calls for 
further  interpretation.  It is  given here only in  order to  suggest 
the correct approach. 
I The equality between aggregate saving ex post and investment arises from the in-
clusion of these: profits and losses in aggregate income. This equality may be recog-
nized  mo~  easily if it is  recalled that the saver is  not necessarily identical with the 
person  who  holds  the  title  to  investment.  Bank  credit  expansion,  for  example, 
might yield  unexpected  profits  to  some entrepreneurs,  who  then  may appear in 
income statistics as  having saved  a cOITesponding amount, whereas the  title to the 
corresponding investment would be held  by the  c~dit expanding bank. 
I nus point is discussed in greater detail in Sec. 3 below. PART  T 'HREE 
In terms of such a function, Keynes' cpsychological law' of the 
cpropensity to consume' could be restated in a less objectionable 
form. As Professor Ohlin has pointed out3,  the propensity to con-
sume, as a psychological fact,  cannot' be a function solely of in-
come ex post,  because this income's unexpected components can-
not  possibly  play any  role  in governing spending during  the 
income period itself. Thus; according to  Keynes, an aggregate 
income of, say,  $10,000, would be associated with spending of, 
say, $8,000 regardless of the source of this income. In fact, how-
ever, spending would be different according to the magnitude of 
the unexpected components, e.g.,  $9,000 expected income plus 
$1,000 unexpected profits versus $1 1,000 expected income minus 
$ I ,000 unexpected losses.  In the second  case  spending would, 
obviously, be larger than in the first. As indicated above, income 
ex post will playa rore in tomorrow's spending. 
2  SAVING AND THE RATE  OF INTEREST 
It has  never been doubted in modern theory that the current 
rate of interest equalizes the supply of money funds to be lent and 
the demand for money funds to be borrowed.  I t is  not correct, 
therefore, for Keynes as well as for Ohlin!l to ascribe to traditional 
theory the view that the current interest rate has the function of 
equalizing saving and investment; for that has been the function of 
the Cnatural  rate' of interest.  In traditional  theory the role  of 
saving has been stressed solely because  ~hanges in the supply of 
funds,  not originating in changes in saving,  were supposed  to 
have  no influence on the long  run  interest rate level,  affecting 
supply and  demand for  funds  about equally.  The  traditional 
view, qualified in some respects even before Keynes, will be dis-
cussed at greater length later. First we want to clarify the main 
difference between Keynes and economic tradition. 
Most conspicuous is Keynes' refusal to differentiate according 
to the sources of the credit supply, namely, between Csaving',  on 
the one hand, and money funds, newly created or dishoarded, on 
the other; and in this respect,  Professor Ohlin seems  to agree 
with him.  I) According to Keynes, the credit supply is derived not 
8  CSome Notes on  the  Stockholm  Theory of Savings  and  Investment',  Part II, 
Economu: Journal,  XLVII Qune 1937), 239. 
'Ihid., p. 221. 
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directly from current income but from that part of the stock  of 
wealth that is  k~pt in money form.  And it must be admitted that 
for the supply in question (or, what is the same thing, for the de-
mand for  'illiquid'  ass~ts) the situation is different from  the de-
mand  for  consumers'  goods,  which  cannot  be  adequately  an-
alyzed without recourse to  wha~  is considered by people as  their 
'income'. Nevertheless, even from  Keynes' point of view, it can-
not be  denied that the  current  rate  of interest would be  lowered 
by any increase in saving associated with an increase in the credit 
supply in the market. Only, and this is  the gist of his theory, in 
contrast to  theoretical tradition,  this new interest rate level can-
not be considered in  any sense as an 'equilibrium' level, neither 
constant nor moving: other things being equal, it would  be fol-
lowed inunediately by a decline in aggregate income and in the 
credit supply on the market. Clearly Keynes' theory replaces not 
the traditional  theory of the 'current rate of interest,  but that of 
the 'equilibrium' rate, provided this equilibrium is interpreted as 
a short run equilibrium in the traditional meaning of that term. 
The oasis of the new theory is the liquidity preference function. 
Nothing,  however,  can  be  deduced  from  the defuiition  of the 
interest rate (i)  as "reward for parting with liquidity for a speci-
fied  period". 6  For  this  is  consonant with  theoretical  tradition, 
according to which, in ordinary times,  there have always existed 
sufficient investm~nt opportunities at a rate of remuneration that 
covers  the  capitalist's  risk  as  estimated  by him;  the  liquidity 
preference function in the market (L), was therefore supposed to 
have the shape of a right angle (Fig. I). In periods of depression, 
on  the  other  hand,  as  has  been  acknowledged  more  recently, 
liquidity preference would become interest rate sensitive, and the 
marginal  productivity of capital  and  the demand for  capital 
would become' inelastic. Under these conditions, a change in the 
interest  rate, -brought  about  by  a  shift  in  the  level  of supply, 
would not influence the amount of investment. If  it is allowed in 
accordance with prevailing doctrines, to consider the propensity 
to save as  fairly independent of interest rate fluctuations over a 
certain range, traditional opinion can be sununarized as follows. 
In ordinary' times, the interest rate is determined by the intersec-
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tion of an almost .vertical supply function  (8) with a negatively 
sloped demand function CD),  the latter being pressed downward 
by the exhaustion of investment opportunities through current 
investment and raised again by technological progress, discovery 
of new  natural resources,  and growth of population  (Fig.  2). 
During depression a positively sloped supply curve intersects an 
almost vertical demand function (Fig. 3). This picture, of course, 
symbolizes only an ideal type of capital market, merging the dif-
ferent capital markets and interest rates that co-exist in real.ity. -
It shows,  however, that the difference between Keynes and the 
traditional opinion cannot be found in the fonn~ definition of 
the interest rate as a price, but in empirical assumptions about 
the shap~ of certain functions. 
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The assumption that liquidity preference is· always a function 
of the rate of interest when combined with the assumption of a 
rigid wage level and a  negatively sloped marginal efficiency of 
capital, therefore, forms the cornerstone of Keynes' theory.7 On 
7 The theoretical structure of Keynes' system has been elucidated in  a  masterly 
study  by John Hicks,  'Mr.  K~ynes and  the  Classics',  Econometrica,  April  I937. 
Nicholas Kaldor, however (EcorJJmic Journal,  December '937, p. 748) lays stress on 
quite a different element: nIt is th.is assumption {that saving is largely a function of 
real income] more than any other which is responsible for the 'revolutionary' inno~ 
vatioes of Mr. Keynes' system." It cannot possibly be implied by Mr. Kaldor that 
the assumption itself is revolutionary. It has been common property of traditional 
theory, and leads, in combination with an inelastic liquidity preference function, 
to  the  orthodox result,  and  in  combination  with  a  negatively  sloped  liquidity 
preference function and the two other basic assumptions mentioned above, to Mr. 
Keynes'  doctrine.  Mr. Kaldor himself refutes,  with  the  help  of the  Keynesian 
liquidity preference function, Professor Pigou's proposition that variatioes in money 
wages entail proportional variations in real wages. Since this propt?sition is  based, 
however, on  the alleged ability of the banking system to stabilize aggregate pur· DISCUSSION 
these assumptions, fluctuations in saving can influence only the 
instantaneous  position  in  the capital market;  and when  con-
sidered for  a  longer, though still short run period,  their effect 
would be offset by the very change in the interest rate they bring 
about.  Indeed,  this  result follows from  Keynes'  basic  assump-
tions,  even if one argues from them on the lines of traditional 
theory: with a given quantity of money any decline in the interest 
rate, according to the first assumption,  would increase  the vol-
ume of idle balances and reduce the volume of transaction bal-
ances;  then,  aggregate  income,  aggregate  demapd  and,  at  a 
given wage level,  output and employment cannot but decline. 
Plainly, the process cumulatively reduces output until a station-
ary state is reached. 8 A positive rate of investment presupposes 
either technological progress, which raises the marginal efficiency 
function, or an increase in the quantity of money. 
It  has already been pointed out that Keynes' theory of interest 
expressly limited as  it is  to short run conditions, in which ca-
pacity is not 'fully' utilized over the whole range of industries,  is 
in closer accordance with tradition than is usually recognized.  9 
For it has never been disputed that in the short run an increase 
in the quantity of money would lower the interest rate; on the 
other hand, it is pointed out by Keynes himself that in the range 
beyond  the 'bottle necks',  both demand  and supply of credit 
would be equally influenced by monetary expansion. Moreover, 
chasing power, it would also fail to be valid were the demand for capital to become 
inelastic in the short run, as suggested above and elaborated more in d~tail in my 
study, 'General Overproduction', Journal oj  Political Economy,  August '934  . 
• Income in the stationary state is  a  minimum magnitude, not governed by the 
multiplier  which  indicates  the  ratio  bctwccn  marginal  investment  and marginal 
income. This minimum income, analogous to  an integration constant in mathe~ 
maties, is supported by replacement investment of a certain amount, which, in con· 
trast to net investment, is  nOt frightened away by high interest rates. Naturally, thc 
average propensity to consume would be equal to unity. 
t  At first glance, the borderline between the range in which Keynes' theory is aIr 
plicable,  and the range for  which 'classical' theory is  still acknowledged as valid, 
sccms to be drawn by Keynes differently from the usual borderline between short 
and long run, which refers  to the degree of utilization. Keynes draws the line at 
'the point of acquiescence', i.e., the point at which workers refuse  to allow the real 
value of their wages to be reduced further by rising commodity prices. However, 
the difference is minimized by the introduction of the concept of'bottle necks', i.e., 
points at which the short run supply curve for a commodity becomes very inelastic. 
If  such bottle necks appear in several industries, the point of acquiescence is  neat. PART  THREE 
the theory of 'reflation', as developed in the decade before the 
publication of Keynes' General  Theory,  has stressed more and more 
the  minor importance of saving and the overwhelming impor-
tance of monetary expansion for any recovery from the depths-of 
'depression'. Likewise, the classical proposition that income, un-
der certain conditions,  is  independent of the saving quota,  is 
compatible  with  Keynes'  system,  provided  the  change in the 
propensity to consume (i.e.,  the multiplier) leads to an opposite 
change jn the rate of investment. The main difference between 
Keynes  and  the  Pre-Keynesians  lies  in  the  views  of  what  is 
'normal' in the capitalistic system: traditional theory considered 
'full' or coptimal' utilization as nOITIlal,  and used this state as the 
starting point of analysis,  while  Keynes  considers  incomplete 
utilization as the natural state of the system.· He even maintains 
that never in·  the history of capitalism has Cfull employment', i.e., 
the point of acquiescence,  been reached. The gap ,has been re-
cently narrowed by Keynes' admission (in some articles in the 
London  Times, January '937), that the British economy did reach 
at that date the point of acquiescence.  . 
The empirical validity of the three basic assumptions under-
lying Keynes'  theory cannot be discussed here at length. The 
negative slope of the marginal efficiency of capital might easily 
prove the most crucial proposition. General theoretical consider-
ations militate for the assumption that (idle balances' of a specu-
lative nature are always a function of the interest rate10;  for any 
change in this rate is likely in the short run to induce some capi-
talists to refrain from immediate long term investing in order to 
profit from a reverse movement, while the volume of short term 
investment opportunities,  which  otherwise  would  represent  a 
temporary haven,  is  limited.
ll As  to the third assumption, the 
rigidity of wage rates in terms of money, it is clearly valid only 
10 Or rather as Keynes  himself remarked recently  ('The Theory of the  Rate of 
Interest' in Lessons oj Morular;)' Experience,  ed. by A.D. Gayer (Farrar and Rinehart), 
1937,  p.  145),  a  function  of several  variables,  of which the  interest rate is  one; 
otherwise the volume of speculative balances could not rise at the beginning of a 
reflation. 
11  Less  weight can be attached to the experience gathered in open market.opera-
tions,  cit~d by K~yn~s  (G~mTal Thmry, p. 197; and again, Ltssanr, p. 149). For their 
function may be, not to substitute speculative balances for security holdings of the 
public,  but  to  stimulate  invesanent,  i.e.,  to  increase  the  volume  of transaction 
balances. DISCUSS·ION 
with reference to limited periods. As Keynes points out,12 a  de-
cline in wage rates·  would free money for 'speculative balances', 
and thus make possible investment even with a given quantity of 
money. The objections to a policy of wage lowering that can be 
raised  from  the  standpoint of an investment  theory  based  on 
profit expectations in the consumers' goods industries are outside 
the scope of Keynes' system. 
3  DlSCREPANCY BETWEEN SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT 
The preceding remarks have not yet settled the question whether 
the definition of 'equilibrium' (as a state of zero profits) requires 
a  concept of 'saving ex  ante'  (and consequently of 'income ex 
ante'),  which would fall  short of,  be equal to,  or exceed invest-
ment. The concept of spending as a function of several variables 
does not answer this question. However, the concept of 'expected 
saving113 can serve this purpose even less. True, since credit in-
flation or deflation creates windfall profits or losses,  their exclu-
sion from the concepts of income and saving seems to restore the 
fundamental importance attributed to the discrepancy between 
saving and investment by Wicksell. But suppose entrepreneurs, 
watching closely  the process of monetary development, except 
changes that are later realized? Plainly, expected saving, which 
now inc~udes their profits ex post, will then match investment, and 
the equality between saving and investment breaks down as  a 
criterion of 'equilibrium' and as  a causal explanation of its dis-
turbance. 
The oilly way out of these difficulties is to recognize as·  income 
only wages, interest, and differ:ential rents for so-called perman-
ent advantages provided by nature. This is Keynes' income con-
cept in the Treatise except that the element of expected profits is 
not mentioned. By making them share the fate of windfall profits, 
it is indeed possible to formulate a valid criterion for equilibrium. 
But it does not require any concept of saving ex  ante;  nor is, the 
equality between some kind of saving and investment that could 
be stipulated as one of the conditions for equilibrium sufficient 
L2  Genual  Tluory,  p. ~63. 
La  Professor Ohlin uses the term 'planned' as equivalent to 'expected' ('Some Notes, 
Part 1', Economic Journal,  March 1937, p. 64), though a  'planned income' sounds 
rather curious. The argument in the text is not affected by the change. in terms, 
unless the' plan' refers to the disposition of yesterday's savings. 180  PART  THREE 
for establishing it. Equilibrium is conditioned by aggregate,prof-
its being zero; and this condition in turn requires the fulfillment 
of the following equation:14 entrepreneurs' spending plus net in-
vestment proper minus factors'  saving equals zero.l6 This equa-
tion shows that the equality between expected saving and ex-
pected investment does not 'secure an equilibrium proper. Na-
turally, as  long as the expectations remain in the sphere of the 
mind, they have no effect at all in the social world; but even if 
they lead  to  actions  (because condition  (a)  Or  (b),  Section  I  ' 
above, is fulfilled), they would fail to secure equilibrium proper, 
as recognized most easily if  the first term on the left hand side is 
assumed to be zero; then, by the investment of expected profits the 
second  term could  be increased  above  the  volume of factor's 
saving,  which certainly would not be reduced by the same in-
vestment process; the equation is thus not fulfilled. 
In traditional theory, the equality between saving and invest-
ment serves not only to define equilibrium proper but also  to 
indicate the end of any process of monetary expansion or con-
t.raction,  even  though in this  state aggregate expected  profits 
would be positive and factor prices ,-",:ould be far from normal. In 
other words, it serves  to indicate the preservation of an histori-
cally given volume of  aggregate demand (which, however, should 
H  The equation refers  to competitive conditions. Under monopoly, the monopo-
list's income and his saving have to be treated on equal footing with factors' income 
or saving. 
U  The term factor denotes  here,  of course, only labor,  capital,  and  nature,  the 
remuneration for which has to be reckoned at normal prices. No ethical judgment is 
implied in  the omission  of specific  entrepreneurial activities;  for  if they  have a 
supply price,  they  are included in labor,  and if they have no supply price, any 
special remuneration is incompatible with equilibrium. Entrepreneurs' spending re-
fers to their spending beyond the income they would receive as 'factors'; such entre-
preneurial spending usually would be conditioned on expected, though not realized 
profits. The tenn 'net investment proper' restricts the investment concept to the 
acquisition of real capital goods in addition to  the existing stock of fixed  capital 
and working capital (or of the titles  to  such goods); and excludes,  therefore,  not 
mere replacement, but also  the acquisition of money funds,  whether designed'as 
additional idle balances or additional transaction balances, i.e., rotating funds  to 
discharge the firm's income and bwmess payments. To any equilibrum ~t  satis-
fies the condition of zero profits, there would correspond a 'neutral' rate of interest 
that would preserve it.  In a  growing system, it must be fixed at such a  level that 
the necessary additional transaction balances would come forth. The volume of the 
latter would be governed by the increase in the quantity of factors,  their 'normal' 
rate of remuneration (if  necessary, adapted to changes' in the marginal productivity 
of factors),  and the degree of differentiation. DISC USS IO N  lSI 
not be confused with stabilizing an historically given price level). 
This condition of a quasi-equilibrium can be best characterized 
with the help of the Robertsonian income concept, which, there-
fore, should be given citizenship in the realm of economic theory: 
yesterday's saving ex post  equals today's net investment proper. 
4  THE 'WELFARE'  CONCEPT OF  INCOME 
In his  introductory remarks,  Professor Haberler points out that 
"national ~ncome has always been regarded by economists as  a 
comprehensive measure of economic progress, of economic weI· 
fare", and he contrasts this 'welfare concept with the concept of 
income as a tool of economic analysis. Both ex post and ex ante con  .. 
cepts of income perform an analytical function. The question 
may therefore be raised as to the relation of the 'welfare' concept 
to the analytical concepts. 
Since it is clear that the welfare of people is contingent upon 
what  they  actually  receive  as  income  during  the  period  con-
cerned, only the ex post concept can be  kindred to  the 'welfare' 
concept. Indeed, the relation is very close.  The welfare concept 
differs from the analytical ex post concept only by Ca)  measuring 
national income, in the sense of income enjoyed by the nation, not 
aggregate income produced within the bounds of the country; Cb) 
taking account of generally accepted normative valuations, while 
the analytiC?al  concept of ex post income  (=  aggregate  income 
produced)  is based  on actual market valuations. 
Aggregate income produced is given by the market value of 
the current net" output. It  is equal to the sum of all personal in-
tomes,  interest,  wages,  rent,  and  profits  (disregarding  for  the 
moment the government's share). This proposition is an analyti-
cal judgment and thus always true, because profits are defined in 
such a way that they make up any difference between the value 
of the net outp\1t and the total of factor remuneration. Aggregate 
incoq1e produced disregards,  therefore, the nationality of the in-
come  recipient,  particularly  of capitalists  and  entrepreneurs, 
while  the  welfare  concept corrects  the  aggregate  income  pro-
duced by the net balance of interest and profits, paid to and re-
ceived from  abroad. 
11 The term <net'  indicates the necessity of excluding that part of current output 
which serves to ·keep constant the stock of real  wealth. The difficulties  implied by PART  THREE 
More difficult is the treatment of payments that do not repre-
sent current commercial obligations, like reparation payments, 
or that are not made in fulfillment of obligations in the juridical 
sense of the word, like immigrants' remittances. Here pure capi-
t'al  transactions must be differentiated from transactions on in-
come'  account.  The  capital  value  of an  immigrant's  fortune 
should preferably not be add~d  to the current national income.17 
But what about the ready cash the immigrant carries with him 
to support himself during the first jobless months,  and certain 
capital goods, like a plough, that he may bring with him? Or, if 
reparations are paid (as the five  billion francs after the Franco-
German War of 1870-7 I) mainly by the sale of foreign securities, 
then their amount could not possibly be deducted from the na-
tional income for  the period concerned. On the other hand, it 
might be difficult in many cases  to  prove a  direct causal rela-
tionship between changes in the capital stock and political obli-
gations.  Here the statistician cannot afford  to  refrain from ar-
bitrary decisions. 
In differentiating (welfare' income from aggregate income pro-
.duced, normative valuations play a  minor role compared with 
the international relations just discussed. By application of these 
normative standards, any market income antagonistic to gener-
ally accepted ethical standards, e.g.,  the income of racketeers, 
prostitutes, etc., is excluded so  far as it is  not already excluded' 
from (aggregate income produced', because no stretching of the 
imagination can discover  any (service' connected with  the  (in-
come'. 
In principle, no normative valuation enters the-process of con-
verting changes in money income into changes in real income 
through the application of price indices; in this respect, I  appar-
ently disagree with Professor Haberler. J'he computation of re-
placement deducted from gross income has to be based on market 
prices. The deflation of the individual's  income must be carried 
through, in principle, by the application of the individual  price 
this condition cannot be examined here; Volume One contains an ample discmsion of 
the problems involved. Here it may suffice  to point out that in drawing the line 
between 'gross' and 'net', again the decision of the market may either be accepted 
or it may be corrected by the observer's nonnative valuations. 
17 The opposite view, however,  is  hdd by M.  A.  Copeland; see  Volume  Ont, Part 
One, p. 26. DISCUSSION 
index, derived from the individual's preference schedule,  1 8 Statis-
tical practice, naturally, has to 'be satisfied with approximations, 
based sometimes on ar.bitrary assumptions; however, neither ap-
proximations nor arbitrary assumptions are  the same  thing as 
normative valuations. The latter enter the stage only if  the statis-
tician substitutes for  the individual's  preference schedule some 
normative preference schedule.19 
The fundamental definition of aggregate income produced as 
the value of net, current output proves useful also in the deter-
mination of the so-called 'private income' and of the so-called 
'public income'; the former refers  to the current net. output in 
the market sphere, i.e., goods possessing"  a market value regard-
less  of their origin,  the latter to  the current net output of real 
services rendered by the  government,  not possessing  a  market 
value. The market value of the private net output is equal to the 
income of the different agents of production (including net prof-
its)  plus cost taxes minus government subsidies,  Cost taxes are 
taxes that are deducted from 'gross income' or from 'gross profit' 
in order to get the usual net income figures. The equation repre-
sents,  therefore,  an analytical judgment,  and is  entirely  inde~ 
pendent of the complicated considerations concerning the inci-
dence of taxes  applied, for example,  by Professor Colm." Nor 
can the analysis of the factors governing the amount of 'public' 
income afterwards exclude some of the cost taxes, because of so-
called double counting; for such exclusion would invalidate the 
fundamental identity. 
Public income must not be confused with the 'government in-
come'  (or  'revenue')  appearing  in  :fiscal  policy  studies.  It is 
largely income of the private members of the society, bestowed on 
them by  the goverrunent  through such public expenditure  as 
satisfy certain criteria. As  to the  valuation of these  public ser-
vices,  the decis~on of the constitutional public authorities repre-
sents, as  Professor Calm pointed out in former writings, an ob-
II The dlfferUices  between  the price indices according  to •  Laspeyres'  (based on 
actual consumption in the gilJtrI year) and 'Paasche'  (based on actual consumption 
in the end year) do not invalidate the statement in the text. If they cannot be re. 
moved by the reeent methods developed by Dr. Staehle and Professor Frisch, then 
we have to put up with two equally justifiable values of real income. 
19 See Copeland and Martin, Part IV, especially Sec. IV. 
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jective standard, corresponding to the decisions of. the market if.1 
the private sphere. Since the services can be evaluated only on 
the basis of money costs,21  the items of public income need de· 
f1ation  like the items of the private income, with a  price index 
especially constructed for this purpose. 
Certain difficulties  arise in connection with the concepts of 
'net'  and' 'real' as  applied to public income. The qualification 
'real', in 'real services~ rendered by the government' is designed 
to exclude all mere 'transfer expenditure', which does not imply 
the surrender of real resources to the government (apart from the 
administrative costs involved22  which also cannot be counted as 
public income). Illustrative of transfer expenditures are relief 
expenditures and pecuniary subsidies to business; as mentioned 
above, the latter are a negative component of private income. No 
differentiation is necessary as to the sources of these transfer ex· 
penditures. If,  for  example, relief expenditures are financed by 
the printing press, then one of two alternatives must materialize: 
either the current private output is stimulated, and private in· 
come and revenue from cost taxes are correspondingly enhanced, 
or private output is  not stimulated. In neither case would the 
relief expenditures represent a part of nation~l income,  private 
or public. I  am unable, therefore,  to attach any significance to 
the concept of 'disposable income', which would include the dole, 
as  suggested by Professor Calm." 
The term 'net' accounts for  the, necessity of excluding from 
public income any government service designed to maintain the 
21  The point is controversial. Professor KU2nets prefers 'taxes' as a measurement of 
public income (with certain qualifications), considering them as  the 'price' paid by 
the taxpayer for  the services concerned. For a  more detailed discussion of the dif-
ference between the two priciples of  valuation see G. C. Means, Part Five, discussion 
by Simon Kuznets, and Dr. Means' reply.]n the considered opinion of the present 
writer it is  not up to the taxpayer to decide about the 'commodity' (government 
service) and the 'price' (taxes); it is the constitutional authorities who render the 
decision or rather who decide what taxes shall be raised to supplement the expected 
revenues from  other sources,  like  loans  and  interest from  public  investment;  in 
rendering this decision they take account of all government expenditure. In other 
words,  they decide  at  the  same  tl·me  the amount of (I)  transfer  expenditure,  (2) 
'exhaustive' expenditure, (3) taxes to be raised, (4)  other revenue to be procured. 
Item (2) reprC!:ents  the 'gross public income'. 
u  cr.  A.  C.  Pigou, A  Study  in  Public  Finance,  Ch. III; Gerhard Calm,  Volkswirt-
sehaJtlidl4  Theorie  der Staatsausgaben  (1927), pp. 47 if; itkm,  i~ Vo'lume  0114,  Part Five, 
pp. 195 if. 
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stock of public capital with the help of which these services are 
. performed.  Beyond  that,  it has been pointed out correctly  in 
Volume  One,  as well as by Professor Haberler, that public services 
rendered to private business must also be excluded.24 But it would 
be going too far to exclude all kinds of public services which, like 
the services of the army, are of some indirect use for private busi-
ness, or which, in general, can be_  considered as indispensable for 
the very existence of the modern state and the modern economy. 
That expenditure for education improves a man's ability to earn 
income,  or  that,  without  buying food,  he  would  not  earn  any 
income at all,  is  not considered sufficient reason  to exclude the 
service or commodity in question from net private output. Cor-
respondingly, only such government services  should be treated 
as  a cost element of private business,  and not counted as pubJic 
net income,  as  would be pald for  by private  business  were  the 
government to cease to  perform them.  Or,  any government ser-
vice is to be excluded from public net income the performance of 
which by the government reduces correspondingly the costs of 
. the private output. From this angle vocational training, build-
ing of roads  to isolated factories, and even the services of a part 
of the  police  force  might  be  excluded . from  public  income, 
but the  bulk  of the  public services,  whether  or not  liked  by 
the taxpayer, would remain.25  It is doubtful, however, whether 
a public income, calculated on these lines, should ever be added 
to private income. Even if both forms of income could be reduced 
to  a  common  denominator  of valuation,  the  ch:;u-acter  of the 
services  rendered in  both spheres  is  so  different  that  public  in-
come, classified summarily under a few headings,  might best be 
presented as  a separate  item. 
III  GOTTFRIED  HABERLER 
I agree with most of Professor Neisser's comments on my paper. 
The points where there  is a real or apparent disagreement con-
cern either questions of  minor importance or questions outside the 
scope of this volume,  or  else would require  a lengthy argument 
24  See Volume  One, Warburton,  Part Two, pp. 63-92; Calm, Part Five, pp. 194-206. 
"  For an attempt at a quantitative allocation of government expenditures between 
expenditures furnishing  services  to  business  and  those  furnishing  services  to  con-
sumers, see Nelson and Jackson,  Part Six. 186  PART  THREE 
for  complete clarification. Therefore  I  refrain from replying to 
Professor Neisser's comments. 
I  should like, however, to m~ke a few remarks on Dr. Cope-
land's strictures. Dr. Copeland begins by saying: "A clear under-
standing of the relationship betiveen these two concepts [viz., S 
and I] .  seems to me to call for a recognition of the fact that in-
vestment represents the value of the increase in asset items on the 
consolidated national balance sheet, and saving, the value of the 
increase in equi  ty." 
I submit that this is not a fact, but a proposal for a convention 
about the use of the two terms. If  it were a  statement 'of fact' 
to the effect that the above meaning is  the meaning generally 
attched to the two terms, there could be no doubt that it is  not 
generally true. 
Dr. Copeland proceeds then to say: "When these two concepts 
are  so  conceived,  it is clear that if saving and investment are 
consistently defined and evaluated for a  given community and 
period, they will  necessarily be equal."  This sentence is  rather 
vague because the distinction between 'conceived' and 'defined' 
is  not  clear.  Perhaps  by  'consistently  defined'  Dr.  Copeland 
means 'consistently applied'. Only this interpretation makes sev-
eral further statements in Dr. Copeland's paper correct, where he 
insists  that consistency of definition implies equality of actual 
saving and investment.  When taken literally  this  is  not true. 
There are consistent definitions of  S and I that do not make them 
equal. Only if he means by a 'consistent definition' a 'consistent 
application of his definition', does his statement become true. 
With Dr. Copeland's criticism of Ohlin's ex ante analysis on 
the ground that it assumes man to  be more of 'a ubiquitously 
budget-making animal' than he really is,  I  am on the whole in 
sympathy. I suggest, however, that it is not so much a question of 
right or wrong as of more or less correct. 
Dr. Copeland's criticism of my discussion of Mr. Robertson's 
definition of S  and I  seems to me to rest on several misunder-
standings. He finds  unconvincing my assertion  that it involves 
confusing and unusual terminology to speak of  saving when work-
ers keep money for a  short period (sayan the average for half a 
week)  because income is  spent more continuously than it is  re-
ceived. He says: "If individuals increase their holdings of cash D  (  S C ·U  S S (0 N 
.... (withou~ decreasing  their holdings of other equities),  this 
increase may fairly be construed as  a form of saving." Now I  do 
not deny that a consistent application of certain savings concepts 
(e.g.,  of  th~ definition proposed by Dr. Copeland himself)  will 
lead to the result that there is saving in that case. I only say that 
this is , in conflict with the unsophisticated everyday usag~ of the 
term. 
The rest of Dr. Copeland's comment I  find  very difficult  to 
follow.  I  haye the impression that he  expects much more en· 
lightenment from the very simple set  of definitions than it can 
possibly furnish. Most of what he says is nothing but a repetition 
of the Robertsonian definitions in slightly different language. In 
addition, he formulates some obvious implications of that set of 
definitions that I  did not state, in a  tone that suggests that they 
constitute an argument against the set of definitions from which 
they are derived. It is, for example, quite true that in Mr. Robert· 
son's scheme an excess of lover S implies an increase of'today's' 
income over 'yesterday's'  income.  This corresponds and gives 
precise expression to the notion that financing of investments in 
another  way than by 'voluntary' saving means,or leads to, inflation. 
To clear up the matter I  should like to state the few relation· 
ships algebraically. Let us denote by yd disposable income, by 
ye earned or received or actual income, and let the subscripts 0 
and  1  refer  to  the 'days',  to 'yesterday' and 'today'. Then we 
.  have: 
'yd _  ye 
I  - 0 
y~ ~ CI + II ~  y~ 
81  ~ y1 - CI  ~ yg - CI • 
Hence 11  - S1  =  Yi - y1  =  Yi - yg. 
Dr. Copeland comes to this conclusion: "Thus the argument is 
reduced to the proposition that the amount of income disposed of 
today exceeds the amount of today's disposable income by the 
amount by which today's income exceeds yesterday's income. In 
other words,  today's entire income  is  disposed  of today."  He 
thinks that this is. an apparent contradiction of the fundamental 
assumption that income received today becomes disposable only 
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The appearance of a  contradiction is  entirely of Dr.  Cope~ 
land's own making. It is due to the fact that he introduces quite 
superfluously the word 'disposed income' for what Mr. Robert-
son and I call 'earned or received income'. This term is not only 
redundant (because Dr. Copeland himself uses simply the words 
e today's income' for the same concept),. but also positively mis-
leading, for the assumption is  that 'today' this income is earned 
or  received  but becomes  disposable,  in other words  may  (but 
need not) be disposed of only 'tomorrow'. If, as  Dr. Copeland 
says, c'in addition to disposing of today's disposable income the 
community disposes  today of an additional sum arising  (say) 
from  an  increase  in"  M,  this  additional  sum  is  not,  in  the 
Robertsonian terminology, disposahle  income of today; it does not 
come 'out of today's (disposable) income', but out of hoards or 
out of nothing, or out of the printing press. It becomes,  however, 
income, it goes into income, viz., 'earned' or 'received' income of 
today and becomes disposable income tOI~orrow. 
I  hope that this disposes of Dr. Copeland's apparent contra-
diction. His own solution seems to me to rest on a  misunderstand~ 
ing. For Dr. Copeland is mistaken if  he thinks that the term 'dis-
posable income' should be interpreted as referring to "  'today' 
viewed in the future tense". He seems to believe that it is  an ex 
ante concept, an expected, planned, 'budgeted' magnitude. 
This is  not correct. 'Disposable income' is  an ex post concept, 
as can be easily seen by substituting for it its definition: earned 
or received or actual income of the 'day' before. 